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A W'W:T'% a C T

Tlu» period sueeeediog the Sestoretio&a of 1819 in Italy
and extending to the final unification of the several sovereign
Italian states in 1870, vas characterised by a revolutionary move
ment toward constitutional government* national unity, and inde
pendence, which has been termed the risorgimemto.

Its supporters

marked their first real success in February 1861, idien they formed
the first Parliaeent representing all Italy, except R<m m and
Venetia, and conferred the title Xing of Italy on Victor Emman
uel II of Sardinia.
The British FoMign Minister, Lord Jobn Russell, attrib
uted the upset conditions in the peninsula to misrule by authori
tarian goveriownts, aided and abetted by oppressive foreign influ
ence.

Bmder his leadership, Great Britain performed a singular

service for the Revolution in 1860, the focal point of our pr<d»lem,
by approving the conduct of the King of Sardinia and by lending
her moral support to this struggle in the n u w of liberty and in
dependence.

The contributors to the Bublin Review believed that

there was a case for the Italian governments| and that Italy's worst
enemies were those who preached the inexorable march of progress, the
awral authority of majorities, and the omnipotence of the state.

%ey

found the policy of Lord John Russell to be incMkSistent and allied
iii
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with the principle# end povere ehich threatened to destroy the basis
of all society and government.
This paper is a snmmry interpretation of the Liberal posi
tion as represented by Lord John Bussell and of the G1tramontane
position as represented by the htoblin Review. Back to back, they
portray the black and the «ribite sides of an otherwise complex ques
tion.
That a significant number of responsible British Catholic
observers as revealed by the Beview, found reason to condemn the
oontesqiorary liberal version of the Italian duestion and British
Foreign Policy in 1860-1861, is not surprising.

Yet, it is chal

lenging to British historians who, with few exceptions, have shown
little or no respect for the position represented by the Beview;
and who have preserved to this day a somemAat nineteenth century
liberal answer to the Italian Question of 1860.

iv
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I

A X.IBXSAL VXXW
OF TB8 ITALIAN Q0B8TIQN M B TUS ITALIAN fOltlXQN POLICY
Of LORD

sms RD88ELL,

1860-1861

Th« Congress of Visuas led to « restoration of Italy which
differed very little from the status qno prevailing in the penin
sula before the Napoleonic wars; and for the next generation Austria
was the real mistress of Italy.

She ruled Lonbardy-Venetla directly;

her princes governed in Parma, Modena, Tuscany; she felt secure in
her power to elect a non-liberal Pope, sympathetic to the Austrian
government; and not only had her troops re-instated the king of
Naples, but she had also obtained a signed agreoswnt from Ferdinand
not to introduce any form of government incompatible with her own.
For a time the new regies was peaceful, but the influence of
the progressive ideas implanted during the Napoleonic era had made
considerable impression on the enlightened nobility and the upper
middle class, impressions t&ioh were translated into action as the
evils of French government faded and the oppressive methods of the
restored governments became increasingly irksome.

In the Papal States

the unique system of theocracy maintained by the Papacy was the weak
est government in the peninsula.

Its ruler was frequently inept,

blind, or ignoble; its law was based on antique statutes; its eoclesi1
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astical administration was corrupt and inefficient; and in the states
over which it ruled anarchy and brigandage were prevalent —

often

requiring the assistance of the great powers of Europe to restore
order.

The States as a whole were economically backward as little

or nothing was done to promote such effects as railways, banks, or
agricultural improvements.

In Naples conditions were worse.

Some

of the laws, institutions, and officials of the Murat regime were
retained but an odious police system, censorship, and the reaction
ary policies emanating from Vienna, the real seat of authority in
Naples, became the basis of government and social life.

Despite

severe laws of punishment the Italians honeycombed the peninsula
with secret societies, notably the Carbonari and Massini*s Young
Italy. Their object of annihilating despotism and replacing it with
constitutional governments sound expression in a series of sporadic
insurrections all of which were ruthlessly suppressed.^

^This very brief summary interpretation of the restoration
and reaction in Italy during the years 1815-1846 has been drawn prin
cipally from the following English language sources: (Monographs),
Sir J. A. R. Marriott, The Makers of Modern Italy, Napoleon— Musso
lini (London: Oxford University Press, 1931), pp. 37-68;J . 8. Schapiro,
Modern and Contemporary European History, 1818-1948, ed. James T. Shotwell, new ed. (Cambridge: The Riverside Press, 1846), pp. 88-97;
G. M. Trevelyan, Garibaldi's Defence of the Roman Republic 1848-1848
(London: Thomas Nelson tmd Sons, 1937), pp. 59-76; A. J. Whyte, The
Evolution of Modern Italy (Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 1950), pp. 19-57;
(Composite Wortej, John Morris Roberts, "Italy, the French Revolution
Period” , Ency. Brit.. XII (1957), pp. 777-782; H. W. V. Temperley,
"Great Britain (1815-32)”, Cambridge Modern History. X (1907), pp.
596-98; Luigi Villari, "Italy — The Risorgimento 1815-1870", Ency.
Brit., XV (1911), 11th ed., pp. 48-61. For a full and impartial
study of this period cf. 0. F. H. Berkeley, Italy in the Maki% 18151846. 2 vols, (Cambridge: University Press, 1936).
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Descriptions by British historians of Italian events in 1848
reveal continued nisgovernment at Rome and Naples.

The election of

Pius IX in 1846 had filled the hearts of Italians with hope.

He was

known to have liberal sympathies and he was tbe first Pope to be
elected without Austrian influence since the establishment of Austrian-Hapsburg hegemony in the peninsula.

His immediate granting

of amnesty to more than a thousand political prisoners and hundreds
of exiles and his subsequent embarkation on the path to reform of
his government was greeted with immense enthusiasm.

But both the

period of his popularity and the era of his reforms were short lived.
Demonstrations of applause for fresh concessions granted were accom
panied by demands for still greater reform, till at length it be
came clear the people would be satisfied with nothing less than a
complete change from the Papal theocratic principle of government
and its forms of administration.^
In the fall of 1848, the liberal prime minister of the Pope,
Pellegrino Rossi, was assassinated, the government overthrown and the
Pope forced to flee to Gaeta.

In February 1849, the temporal power

of the Pope was declared abolished and the Massinians, who had gained
control of the movement, proclaimed the establishment of a pure democ
racy to bo callod the Republic of Rome.

place throughout the peninsula.

Similar events were taking

The king of the Two Sicilies and

the autocratic rulers of Parma and Modena had been put to flight by

\illari, "Italy", Ency. Brit.. XV (1911), 11th ed,, p. 51.
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their subjects.

However, the revolutionists still lacked the unity

and power to prevent the great powers* decision to re-instate the
legitimate governments.

French troops, for example, restored the

temporal power in July 1849, despite an heroic resistance led by
Garibaldi.
On the Pope's return in April 1950, it soon became evident
that little hope could be placed in a reformed or reforming Papacy.
The Pope refused, absolutely, to admit constitutional limitations
on his power; his secretary of state. Cardinal Antonelli, was comr
missioned to suppress with all possible vigour the political agita
tion which still persisted.

The old ecclesiastical absolutism had

been re-established: Pio Hono had become the chief opponent of
nationalism and democracy,^
In Naples, where the corrupt and inefficient government of
the king was restored by the sovereign's own troops, suppression was
particularly severe.

The ferocious treatment of "political" pris

oners as well as the general character of the administration prompt
ed Lord Gladstone to brand the institution as "the negation of God

^"He[ the Pope] promised, indeed, a consultative council
of state, and granted an amnesty from which no less than 25,000
persons were excluded; but on his return to Rome (April 12, 1850),
after he was quite sure that France had given up all idea of im
posing constitutional limitations on him, he re-established his
government on the old lines of priestly absolutism, and, devoting
himself to religious practices, left political affairs mostly to
the astute [Cardinal] Antonelli, who repressed with great severity
the political agitation which still continued." Ibid.. p. 55.
Schapiro believes this change of heart by Pius IX caused the move
ment toward unification to become tinged with anti-clericalism.
Schapiro, Modem and Contemporary European History, p. 202.
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erected into a system of government".*
With the half-hearted support of the Pope,® the Duke of
Tuseany, and the King of the Two Sicilies, Charles Albert of Sar
dinia led an unsuccessful attempt to push the Austrians out of the
peninsula in July 1848.

When his second attempt vmt with a sim

ilar fate in 1849, Charles Albert abdicated in disgust and his son,
Victor Emmanuel II ascended the throne.

The new King of Sardinia

refused the generous terms of peace offered by Austria in exchange
for his revocation of the constitution granted previously by his
father at Turin,

"'If you wish a war to death, so be it . . .

If

I must fall, it will be without shame; my House knows the road to
exile, but not to dishonor.'"®

Thus Victor Emmanuel turned a de

feat into a moral victory.
Both ideas of a Federation under the Presidency of the Pope,
and a Republic, one and undivided, had been discredited by events

*These words of W r d Gladstone were quoted by many of the
authorities mentioned (see above, p. 2, n. 1). Marriott quotes at
length all three reasons given by Gladstone for his condemnation of
the Neapolitan Government, and concludes: "it is impossible to fol
low in detail the minute evidence upon which the English statesman
based this appalling but not exaggerated indictment," Marriott,
Makers of Modern Italy, p. 124. In his note 2, on page 122, Marriott
further points out that "The full text of these Letters together with
Mr. Gladstone's Examination of the Official Reply of the Neapolitan
Government (1852) may (amd^ should^ be read' in full in Gleanings of"~
Past Years, vol. iv (John Murray, 1879)."
®ln his fawns Allocution of April 29, 1848, the Pope de
clared his refusal to sanction an aggressive war against Austria.
"From that day onwards he had forfeited the sympathy of all good
Italians, and was compelled to rely more than ever on the support
of the clericals and San-Fedists." Trevelyan, Defence of the Roman
Republic, p. 75, See also: John Morris Roberts, **Italy, the French
Revolution Period, 1796-1849", Racy. Brit,. XII (1957), p. 781.
®8chapiro. Modern and Contemporary European History, p, 202.
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in 1848: henceforth, hopes of driving Austria out of the peninsula
and of securing liberty m é independence under reformed governments
were centred in the Constitutional Monarchy of Sardinia.^
At the Paris Peace Conference in 1856 the Italian Question
was placed squarely on the European political state.

After the

Conference, Cavour explained to Lord Clarendon his own views of the
difficulties in Italy as well as their European prospects:
'That which has passed in the Congress proves two
things: first, that Austria is decided to persist
in her system of oppression and violence towards
Italy; secondly, that the forces of diplomacy are
Impotent to modify that system. See the conse
quences for Piedmont. With the irritation on our
side and the arrogance of Austria on the other,
there are but two alternatives to take: reconcile
ourselves to Austria and the Pope, or prepare to
declare war at the Court of Vienna in a future not
far distant. If the first part is preferable I
must on my return to Turin advise my king to call
to power the friends of Austria and the Pope. If
the second hypothesis is best, my friends w d I
will not shrink from preparing for a terrible
war — a war to the death.*®

7

In addition to those English language sources already men
tioned (see above, p. 2, n. 1), the following are most useful in
examining this liberal view of Italy in the period 1846-1850: Bol
ton King, A History of Italian Unity, 2 vols. (London: J. Nesbit,
1012), a full survey of the Italian risorgimento King's work is
strongly anti-clerical; Janet Penrose Trevelyan, A Short History
of the Italian People: frmm the Barbarian Invasions to the Present
Bay, revised edition with an epilogue by D. Mack Smith, foreword
by 6. M. Trevelyan (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1956). Per a
presentation of the clerical viewpoint cf. £. E. Y. Hales, Pie Mono:
A Study in European Politics and Religion in the Nineteenth Century
(London: 'Eyre 'and sipottiswoode, 1954),
Harriott, Makers of Modern Italy, p. 101.
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Few British historians have disputed Cavour*s analysis or found
reason to condemn him for persuading his sovereign to act on the
second hypothesis.

d

Following the Conference, Cavour pressed England for armed
assistance against Austria.

But the Queen and her ministers de

clined to prmaise anything more than England's moral support.

In

search of a more tangible aid, Cavour then turned to Napoleon 111
who had expressed a desire to do something for I t a l y . T h e r e
followed a secret meeting of the Count and the Snperor at Plombiers
in 1888 where the two agreed that Austria be expelled from the
peninsula; North and South Italy were to be united under the House
of Savoy, while Nice and Savoy were to be annexed to France and
Victor Emeanuel's daughter was to be married to Napoleon's cousin.
Despite the hostile attitude of Europe toward the prospects
of another war and its utmost diplomatic efforts to prevent it, Sar
dinia and France took to the field against Austria in April of 1889.
This war of Italian Independence began with a series of Allied suc
cesses but was abruptly ended by Napoleon who, on the eve of com
plete victory, decided to end the hostilities.

Without consulting

*Ibid.. pp. 103-139.
^®"*Que peut on faire pour l'Italie?' was Napoleon's sincere
but someidiat indiscreet question to Cavour in 1885.” Ibid., p. 102.
^^For some interesting observations as well as a part of
the conversations between the Emperor and the Count at this famous
meeting see Hales, Pio None, pp. 189-191.
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the «iehee of his ally Vietor Emanuel, he met Francis Joseph at
Villafranea on July 11, and there the two emperors arranged between
themselves the preliminaries of peme.
At this critical moment in Italian affairs our real interest
in Britain's Italian Foreign Policy begins.

In the week following

the Austrian defeat at Solferino in 1859, Lord John Bussell

had

accepted the seals of the Foreign Office and from the moment he as
sumed this responsibility, he committed himself and the official
policy of his country to one of 'Italy for the Italians.'

Through

out the two years which followed Sardinia's bitter disappointment
at Villafranea in July, 1859, Great Britain, under the leadership
of Lord John, performed a singular service for the Patriots of Italy
by lending moral support to the risorgimento and by approving the
conduct of the King of Sardinia.

For this reason, it has been said

that modern Italy owes more to the moral support of England than to
the material support of Napoleon I11.^®

^%he Right Honourable Lord John Russell, first Earl Rus
sell, P. C., K. G., G. C. H. G. Educated in Westminster and Edin
burgh Universities, he was the third son of the sixth Duke of Bed
ford. He entered Parliamentary service in 1813 and sat in the Com
mons for a total of forty-seven years. During this time his name
was prominently connected with most political events of his country.
He served variously as: Secretary of State for the Home, Foreign and
Colonial Departments ; Lord President of the Council; Commander to the
Congress of Vienna; and was First Lord of the Treasury (Premier) from
1846-1852. He was afterwards appointed Foreign Secretary (18 June
1859) and he held that office till he again became First Lord of the
Treasury in 1865. He Was raised to the peerage as Earl Russell and
Viscount Amberley 30 July 1861. Born in 1792, he died in 1878,
twelve years after his retirement from public office in 1866.
Burke's Genealogical and Heraldic History of the Peerage. Baronet-
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This va# not the first Important manifestation of British
interest in the Italian gestion: there had been a number of in
stances when Britain and her statesmen showed their sympathy to
ward the cause of the Italian patriots.

Lord John himself sympa

thised with their apparent misfortunes from the time he first visit
ed the peninsula as little more than a boy.

It is not surprising

then to find him, as prime minister in 1847, sending a special mis
sion under the guidance of Lord Hinto to encourage the Pope to take
the path of progress v^en the Pontiff was hesitating between his
desire to initiate liberal methods of government and the pressure
of the reactionary policies being advocated by Metternich.^*
Again, it was due to British insistence that the Sardinian
minister, Cavour, was admitted on equal terms with the other dele
gates to the Paris Peace Conference in 1853.

Here, it was hoped,

the Sardinian minister would find the opportunity to present before
the assembled plenipotentiaries of Europe, Sardinia's and England's

age & Knightage, founded 1826 by John Burke and Sir Bernard Burke,
C.B.; ed. L. G. Pine, lOGth ed. (London: Burke's Peerage, 1953).
Sir Spencer Walpole, Life of Lord John Russell, II (Lon
Longmans, Green and Co., 1889), 2d ed., p. 309^ As Walpole
is still considered the authority on the Italian Foreign Policy of
Lord John Russell, we have relied principally on his work which we
have cited here. Supplementary studies touching on this same sub
ject will be found listed in the Bibliography.
don;

^*In 1847, Lord Minto visited the Italian Courts to try to
induce the recalcitrant despots to mend their ways, so as to avoid
revolutionary war, the latter b e l ^ England's especial anxiety;
this mission, although not destined to produce much effect, aroused
extravagant hopes among the liberals." Walpole, op. cit., p. 38.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

10

opinion of the pitiable conditions of Italy, especially in the Nea
politan and Roman States, and to expose Austrian responsibility for
an intolerable condition of affairs.

Cavour vas still waiting

for a propitious moment in which to make his speech, when at the
point of adjournment the British minister, Lord Clarendon, deliver
ed an indictment of the Roman Government as powerful and as accu
rate as could have been made by the most ardent Italian patriot.
On July 13, 1859, Lord Jdbn received in a communication
from the British Minister at Turin the conditions of peace pro
posed at Villafranea.

Venetia and the Quadrilateral were to be re

tained by Austria while LonAardy was to be ceded by Austria.

The

rulers of Tuscany and Modena, who bad been deposed by their sub
jects, were to be restored to their thrones ; the Bourbon princi
pality of Parma was to be at Napoleon's disposal; and Italy's
princes were to be united in a confederation under the presidency
of the Pope.
King Victor Emmanuel signed the armistice which followed
Villafranea^® with the reservation that he meant no agreement with

^®Marriott, Makers of Mo d e m Italy, pp. 100-101. With re
gard to the pitiable conditions of Italy, see Villari, op. cit.,
p. 65.
^®The settled terms at Villafranea were: "Italy was to be
free not to the Adriatic but only to Mincie; Austria was to retain
Venetia and the Quadrilateral; Lombardy up to the Mincie was to be
handed over to Napoleon, who would, of course, transfer it to Pied
mont. Leopold of Tuscany and Francis of Modena were to be restored
to the thrones from which they had been driven by their respective
subjects, 'but without the use of force'; Parma and Piaeeama — being
Bourbon not Hapsburg principalities — were annexed to Piedmont; Italy
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regard to central Italy and he complained aomewhat bitterly of
Napoleon's hasty truce and of having been deserted by his prime
minister at the moment of greatest difficulty.

At Milan and Venice

Italians were placing their last hope in the support of England —
Napoleon was regarded as "il gran traditore".
Austria wanted the terms of the armistice embodied in a
treaty and she joined France in thinking a European Congress should
be convoked in order to settle the remaining Italian questions under
the terms of a European treaty.
It appeared to Lord John that a peace Wkich left Italy di
vided and dominated by Austria and France was quite out of harmony
with many of the views expressed by both France and Britain at the
Paris Peace Conference in 18S6.

He declared, therefore, that before

he could consider the newly proposed Conference be would have to
know whether the freeing of Italy from the presence of foreign
troops would be denied by continued French and Austrian occupation
of Borne and the Romigna; whether the people of Tuseany would be al
lowed to convoke an assembly "'in order that the wishes of the
people in favour of the autonomy of that country may be regularly
and freely expressed'"^® or whether the Dukes would be restored to

was to be united in a confederation under the honorary presidency of
the Pope." Marriott, Makers of Modern Italy, p. 110. The fortified
cities of Pesohiera, Mantua, Verona, Legnano, formed the four corners
of the impregnable area known as the Quadrilateral; see map in Mar
riott, op. cit., opposite p. 38.
l^Nalpole, Life of Lord John Russell. II, p. 310.
l®Ibld., p. 311.
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their thrones by force; whether Victor Emmanuel and the Bourbon,
Francis II, King of the Two Sicilies, would be given free choice of
entering the proposed confederation; and whether Austria, as owner
of Venetia, would be a member of the Confederation, which fact, he
believed, would convert the Italian Confederation into an Austrian
Confederation.

Lord John thereupon informed both Paris and Vienna

he believed "that every people had a right to choose their own
Government, and that 'the restoration of the Grand Duke of Tuscany
and the Duke of Modena by foreign forces would be to return to that
system of foreign Interference which for upwards of forty years has
been the misfortune of Italy and the danger of E u r o p e . S u c h
were Lord John's views on the peace.
Quite understandably his policy of "Italy for the Italians"
was regarded "with extreme irritation" at Vienna, but the anger of
Austria, in itself,
adopted a policy

was notsufficient toovercome

of delayhoping thatevents

tunity for interference.

herprudence;

she

might offer anoppor

For his part Napoleon III could not afford

to have England replace France in the affections of the Italians.
Moreover, in order to win England to accept the idea of a congress,
Napoleon was ready to concede much.®®
Meanwhile events in Italy directly favoured Lord John's
policy.

Representative assemblies meeting in Tuseany, Modena, and

^®Ibid.,

p. 312.

®°Ibid..

p. 313.
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Parma arrived at a unanimoua decision in favour of annexation to
Piednont.

When Victor Emmanuel applied to Lord John for counsel as

to whether or not he should recognise and accept their decision,
Lord John advised him unofficially that he might say to Europe:
"'the creation of a large kingdom in the north of Italy was a mat
ter so much affecting the balance of power that he could not under
take the decision of such a question without European consent; but
la the meantime he would be prepared to defend Tuscany against the
danger of internal disorder. '**
moved quickly.

Thus encouraged, Central Italy

On the first of October it was announced that the

govermmat of Tuscany would be conducted in Victor Emmanuel's name;
and on the ninth of the following month Victor Emmanuel's cousin.
Prince Carignan, was appointed Regent of the Duchy.

These rapid

developments were too much for Napoleon who immediately vetoed
the appointamnt of the Prince.

Victor Emmanuel again applied to

Lord John but failed to obtain assurance of England's support
against Austria.

Thus he was forced to accede to the demands of

Napoleon; a Piedmontese statesman. Signor Bucompagni, was named
in tbe place of Prince Carignan.
On the tenth of November 1859, the peace negotiations at
Zurich

#ere convicted and the invitations for the Congress were

®^Ibid.. p. 314.
®®The terms of settlement at the peace were, for all prac
tical purposes, identical with those agreed upon at Villafranea
(see above, p. 10, n. 16).
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But the Congr«»s, set for January, was destined never to
meet.

Late in Beoember, there appeared from the pen of "La Gueron-

niêre" the famous pamphlet "Le Pape et le Congrès".

This pamphlet

from Paris proclaimed Napoleon's acceptance of the fait accompli
of the revolt of the Romagna.Henceforth, a Federation of Italy
would only be discussed on the basis of the separation of the Ro
magna frcwi the Papal State.

Austria and the Pope, who had readily

agreed to the idea of a Congress, refused to Join a conference on
this newly proposed basis of discussion.

Definite settlement seemed

more remote than ever.
These events neither checked nor disturbed Lord John's
plan of an "Italy for the Italians".

Should the possibility of

a Congress be altc^ether ended he was prepared to concert with
France and Sardinia in order to prevent Austrian intervention.

But

some division in the Inglish court caused him to modify his proposals
and in January 1830 he suggested that:
*1. France and Austria should agree not to inter
fere for the future by force in the internal affairs
of Italy unless called upon to do so by the unanimous
consent of the five great powers of Surope.
'2. The Bnperor of the French should concert with
his Holiness the Pope as to the evacuation of Rose by
the troops of France.
*3. % e internal government of Venetia not to be
in any way matter of negotiation between the Suropean
powers.

^®"La Gueronnlere” was a pseudonym for writers of Napoleon
Ill's pamphlets, "it was part of Napoleon's technique to throw out
pamphlets of this kind to test public reactions." Hales, Pio Nono,
p. 192.
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4, Great Britain and France to invite the
ling of Sardinia to agree not to send troops in
to Central Italy until its several States and prov
inces shall, by a nee vote of their Assemblies
after a nee election, have solemnly declared
their wishes as to their future destiny. Should
that decision be in favour of snneaation to Sar
dinia, Great Britain and France will no longer
require that Sardinian troons should not enter
those States and provinces*
France accepted the pr*wosals and though Austria was much
against such a policy she adhkitted she had no intention of inter
fering in Italy,

'nte end was cxming near.

In January Cavour returned to office and Lord John, who
was indirectly responsible for his re-appointment, was delighted
to see Italian affairs once more under the control of his firm
bands.

25

On the eleventh of March, 1850, in a plebiscite held at

the suggestion of Lord John, the people of Central Italy once again
declared almost unanimously for union with North Italy.

On the

twenty-fifth of March elections sore held in Tuscany, Modena, Parma,
and the Bomagna; on the second of April representatives fr«m these
States met at Turin in the first Italian Parliament.
Meanwhile, quiet arrangements had been completed between
Napoleon and Cavour regarding France's annexation of Nice and Savoy.
Lord Jdhn had been opposed to this sacrifice by Victor Bmmanuel from
the mmrnnt he had heard the first rumours of the policy.

But, in his

®Salpole, Life of Lord John Bussell, II, p. 318.
®®Ibid., p. 316.
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protest, Lord John stood alone,

Cavour was pleased to have Napoleon

a party to an agreement by which Sardinia was raised to the status
of an Italian power; Austria could see no distinction between French
annexation of Savoy and Piedmontese annexation of Tuscany; Russia
could see no disruption in the balance of power resulting from the
international transaction; and as the people of Nice and Savoy had
voted in favour of annexation. Lord John's hands were tied.

Never

theless, he was determined Nice and Savoy should be the end of
French encroachments.

In the House of Commons he publicly, though

unofficially, denounced the French Government's aggressive policies
and called on Europe for an end to these flagrant abuses of the
rights and limits of other states.

As intended, the speech pro

duced a great stir, particularly in the French court.

While not

solely responsible for checking the ambitions of Napoleon, it con
siderably retarded the readiness of the Emperor to attempt further
annexations,^*
Encouraged by Lord John's stand. Count Reichberg author
ised Count dpponyi to assure Lord John confidentially that:

^Though speaking unofficially Lord John was whole-heartedly
supported by the Primm Minister, Lord Palmerston. "Lord Palmerston
soon made it plain that, if the Foreign Secretary had spoken without
authority, the Prime Minister shared his opinions. General Flahault,
as he was about to start for Paris, asked [him] whether he had any
message for the Emperor Napoleon. Lord Palmerston answered. Repeat
to your Emperor Lord John Russell*s speech, and tell him it expresses
my own opinions.'
'Mais c'est la guerre!' said the peace-loving
General. Lord Palmerston shrugged his shoulders and replied, 'Eh
bien! si c'est la guerre, c'est la guerre. Quo voules-vous? Nous
smmes préparés, et nous l'attendons de pied ferme.'"
Walpole,
Life of Lord John Russell. II, p. 321.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

17

Though Austria could not support the proposals of
England respecting Savoy, she considered the safety
of Europe to depend on the faithful observance of
treatiesi and that she was ready to enter into an
arrangement with Great Britain to resist all fur
ther encroachments.27
The proposal only served to reveal the profound difference
of opinion existing between the Count and Lord J<din.

They might

agree on the necessity of defending a nation such as Belgium or
Germany but as Lord John said:
'In Italy the question of territorial circumspec
tion is mixed up with questions of internal govern
ment, . . . and neither the government, nor the
Parliasmnt, nor the people of Great Britain would
ever sanction a war to support the authority of
the King of the Two Sicilies against the just dis
content of his subjects.
This declaration, made in April, could hardly have been
more timely.

Insurrection had again broken out in Sicily and on

the sixth of May, General Garibaldi had sailed from Genoa to aid
the Insurgents.

By the end of July he was master of the whole island.

Neither Garibaldi's venture nor its success surprised Lord
JOhn.

Almost frcna the mmmnt he assumed office he had warned the

Neapolitan Government of the consequence of its misrule.

If the

King insisted upon a despotic police system and refused to admit
liberal methods of internal government he could expect the over
throw of his dynasty and its replacement by a less oppressive and
corrupt form of administration, whether Royal or Republican.

**Ibid.. pp. 821-322.
**Ibid.. p. 322.
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But if Lord John was not surprised by these events in Sicily
he was concerned.

The new kingdom, he believed, must not be allowed

to grow too quickly; furthermore, he feared additional annexations
by Sardinia would provide excuse for fresh aggrandisement by France.
Be urged Cavour, therefore, to be patient, not to entertain designs
on Sicily nor to sanction aggression on Naples by Austria.
rapidity of events outdated Lord John's advice.

The

By the beginning

of July the Sicilians were declaring their desire for annexation to
Piedmont and Garibaldi was preparing to cross the Straits of Messina.
The difficulties of harmonising his policy of non-intervention, with
his desire to see the revolution confined to the Peninsula, were in
creasing.
Sicily.

Be was anxious lest Naples should follow the path of
He had no desire to see the union of Piedmont with the Two

Sicilies, at least not for the moaent; the realisation of the dream
of a United Italy pointed too readily to a possible attack on Venetia
and a subsequent war with Austria.

However, when France suggested

Bnglsnd join her in stopping Garibaldi's passage to the mainland,
the British Government, acting on the advice of Lord John, declined
to accept this policy and allowed the general to cross the Straits.
The revolution was permitted to run its course.2®

By the

seventh of September the "liberator" was at Naples declaring his in**Lord John believed Garibaldi lacked the force to take
Naples alone; and should the Neapolitans join him in revolution
against their King, it would remain a matter to be settled by the
Neapolitan Government. In neither case would the British Govern
ment interfere in the internal affairs of the Kingdom of the Two
Sicilies.
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tentioa of marching on Row.

Fortunately, for the eauae of the pa

triots, a surprisingly stiffened resistance by the Neapolitan troops
held the impulsive Garibaldi back and a clash with French troops
stationed at Rome was averted.

Meanwhile, Cavour, excusing his ac

tions as a necessary expedient to maintain order among the excitable
population, invaded the Papal States on the eleventh of September.
The greatly outnumbered Papal forces under the Pope's General Lamoriciere were caught unawares, and on the twenty-eighth of Septem
ber the brief campaign was ended at Ancona.

Victor Emmanuel and

Garibaldi entered Naples together on the seventh of November.

Mean

while, Cavour had requested the Turin Parliament to authorise the
annexation of Central and Southern Italy.

In February, 1861, the

first Parliament representing all Italy, except Rome and Venetia,
met at Turin and conferred the title Kii^ of Italy on Victor Em
manuel II.

Though Great Britain was the sole great power in Europe

to applaud the event, these were great mmaents in the history of the
risorgimento.

To those who favoured the Revolution in 1869-1860,

the Sardinian victory over King Francis of Naples and the Italian
unity now symbolised by the constitutional crown of Sardinia meant
the first real success among many attempts and failures of the
Italian people to win their liberty from Italian despots, to rise
to the status of a nation, and to secure their freedom from threat
of the return of the Austrian Regime in the peninsula.

Though

Venice remained outside the new kingdom until 1866 and Rome was
not acquired until 1870, the first great step in the making of
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modern Italy had been aueeeaafully conpleted.

During the course of

these dramatic events Lord John had adhered to his policy of non
intervention and had done his utmost to confine the revolution to
Italy.

His fear of an attack by Sardinia on Venetia, and of subse

quent fresh annexations by franco which were being so persistently
rumoured, led him to announce to Piedmont on the thirty-first of
August that "an attack on Venice would be an infraction of the
Treaty of Zurich, which the King of Sardinia had no excuse for vio
lating".

Fresh cessions of Italian territory could not be coun

tenanced by England —

Italy was for the Italians.

This counsel of

moderation was delivered on August 31st, ten days after Garibaldi
had landed at Calabria.

But in October, when the war was at its

height, and authoritarian Europe was hastening to register its dis
approval, Lord John joined Sardinia in her hour of difficulty.

At

a time when France, Bussia, and Spain had severed diplomatic rela
tions with Sardinia, and Prussia had expressed her indignation and
disapproval. Lord Joha issued a despatch in which he declared Eng
land's whole-hearted support of the revolution and approval of the
conduct of the King of Sardinia.

This famous despatch dated October

27, 1860, appeared in Italy in November and it is sufficiently impor
tant for our purposes to warrant quoting it at length.

In it Lord

John said:
'There appear to have been two motives which
have induced the people of the Roman and Neapolitan

®*Walpole, Life of Lord John Russell, II, p. 325.
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States to have joined willingly in the subver
sion of their Governments. The first of these
was that the Governments of the Pope and the
King of the Two Sicilies provided so ill for
the administration of justice, the protection
of personal liberty, and the general welfare
of the people, that their subjects looked for
ward to the overthrow of their rulers as a
necessary preliminary to all iaqprovement in
their condition.
The second motive was that a conviction
had spread, since the year 1848, that the only
manner in which the Italians could secure their
independence of foreign control was by forming
one strong Government for the whole of Italy.
Looking at the question in this view, her
Majesty's Governwnt must admit that the Ital
i a n themselves are the best Judges of their own
interests.
That eminent jurist Vattel, when discussing
the lawfulness of the assistance given by the
United Provinces to the Prince of Orange when
he invaded England and overturned the throne of
James II., says, 'The authority of the Prince
of Orange had doubtless an influence on the de
liberations of the States General, but it did
not lead them to the commission of an act of
injustice; for, when a people from good reasons
take up arms against an oppressor, it is but an
act of justice and generosity to assist brave
w n in the defence of their liberties. '
Therefore, according to Vattel, the question
resolves itself into this: Did the people of
Naples and of the Roman States take up arms
against their Government for good reasons?
Upon this grave matter her Majesty's Govern
ment hold that the people in question are them
selves the best judges of their own affairs.
Her Majesty's Government do not feel justified
in declaring that the people of Southern Italy
had not good reasons for throwing off their al
legiance to their former Governments. Her Maj
esty's Government, therefore, cannot pretend to
blame the King of Sardinia for assisting them. .
It must be admitted, imdoubtcdly, that the
severance of the ties t&ieh bind together a
sovereign and his subjects is in itself a mis
fortune. Motions of allegiance become confused;
the succession of the throne is disputed; adverse
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parties threaten the peace of sooiety; rights
and pretensions are opposed to each other, and
mar the harmony of the State. Yet it must be
acknowledged, on the other hand, that the Ital
ian revolution has been conducted with singular
temper and forbearance. . . .
'Such having been the causes and concomitant
circumstances of the revolution of Italy, her
Majesty's Government cwa see no sufficient
grounds for the severe censure with which Aus
tria, France, Prussia, and Russia have visited
the acts of the King of Sardinia.
'Her Majesty's Government will turn their
eyes rather to the gratifying prospect of a
people building up the edifice of their lib
erties, and consolidating the work of their in
dependence, amid the sympathies and good wishes
of Europe. — I am, Ac.,
J. Russell.'31
In Italy the despatch was received with delight.

Cavour

immediately acknowledged the immense service Lord John had per
formed for the Italian people.

Villamarina's first exclamation

was that it was "'worth more than 100,000 men'".

From Rome,

Lord John received a private letter from his nephew, Mr. Odo Rus
sell, saying:
'. . . thousands of people copied it from each
other to carry it to their homes and weep over
it for joy and gratitude in the bosom of their
families, away from brutal mercenaries and
greasy priests.
every day convinces me more and more that I am
living in the midst of a great and real national
movement, which will at last be crowned with
perfect success, notwithstanding the legion of
enemies Italy still counts in Europe. . . .'**

B^Ibld.. pp. 326-327.
^^Marriott, Makers of Modern Italy, p. 135.
2®Walpole, Life of Lord John Russell. II, pp. 328-329.
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Lord John's blographor. Sir Sponcar Walpolo, believes that
there is soaroely any document which Lord Jchn ever wrote "that
bears on its face more distinctly the impress of his style or the
colour of his opinions.

Probably no other statesman but Lord Jcdin

would have rested the defence of General Garibaldi and Count Cavour
on the Revolution of 1688.’*®'*
Apart trma these two points the despatch has other and
still wider points of significance.

In it Lord John was express

ing to Europe, not only his own view of the risorgimento, but in a
general way he was expressing the opinions of a great many English
men as well as being in close agreement with Italian patriots and
statesmen.

With Lord John's despatch of October 1860 our interest

in his foreign policy ends.

But, we may note in concluding this

chapter that the interpretation of the Italian Question by the ma
jority of British historians bears a remarkable resemblance to the
understanding of Lord John: especially in regard to the character
of the Roman and Neapolitan governments and the nature of Austrian
influence in Italy.

Thus, in our summary of the Italian Question

as in our sketch of Lord John's policy we have been discussing, in
a general way, a sympathetic viewpoint of an Italian struggle in
the name of Liberty end Independence.

Again, aa we have aald, this

same view was shared by many other parties politically significant
in mid-aioeteenth century British society*

But, by the same token,

**%bid.. p. 327.
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there were else pertlee, net without Influence, who challenged this
Interpretation of the Italian Question and of the foreign policy
of their government.

It is to one such dissenting group that we

now turn.
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AH ULTRAMDHTANE VIEW
or 181 ITALIAN QUESTION AND THE PAPAL POSITION, 1846-1850
AS MOORSm) IN THE DUBLIN REVIEW

The Dublin Review believed that future historians would be
hard pressed to unravel the meaning of the foreign affairs of Eng
land in 1860-1861.

The men at the head of the governmnt, all of

whom were either aristocrats, or closely allied to the vmst illus
trious families in the nation, had supported the most revolutionary
party in Europe.

Historians iwuld not find it a simple task to ex

plain why the gentlemen of the English Cabinet had thus aided in
their foreign policy men who had "trwapled under foot all consti
tuted authorities, all law, all order, all treaties, all principles
of justice and of property".^

Let us first examine the Review's

refutation of the "two motives" laid down by Lord John Russell in
stating the cause of the revolutionary party, and second, the opin
ions of the Review on the principles of this policy, by beginning

^Sir W. H. Barron, "Our foreign Policy in 1860-61',' Dublin
Review (orig. ser.), XLIX (Feb. 1861), 417. Note: With the ex
ception of n. 21 in Chapter 111, references to the Dublin Review
in this and the succeeding chapter pertain to its "original series"
only. Further indication of the series will therefore be omitted
while the nomenclature of the Review will be abbreviated thus: DR.
Details pertaining to the arrangement of articles in the Review will
be found in the Bibliography on p. 69.
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with a brief (teseriptioa of the significant events in the years
1846-1859.
The reader will recall the charge of Lord John Russell that
the people of the Roman and Neapolitan States had joined willingly
in the subversion of their governments as the first step necessary
toward the attainment of a proper administration of justice, the
securing of personal liberty, and the maintenance of the general
welfare of their states.*

In the estimation of the Review, the

charge was too sweeping and not unlike those levelled by "all dema
gogues in all countries under the sun, wad frequently charged against
British rule in Ireland, in Canada, in India".
the facts of the case.

3

It did not admit

Bow would Lord John explain, for example,

2
See above, p. 21. Lord John's despatch on 27 October 1860.
Limited space prevents a detailed description of the opinions of
the Review on the condition of affairs in the Neapolitan States:
we will confine our remarks, therefore, to our interest in the re
action of the Review to the "Roman Question". It is worth noting
that in their defence of Rome's Civil Government m in their sup
port of the Pope la his struggle against the progressive liberal
ism of the day, the contributors to the Dublin Review adopted a
position which differed from that advocated"by'the"leading English
Liberal Catholics. Cardinal Wiseman, Dr. Purcell, and others
considered it their task to refute both the liberal philosophy
and the solutions suggested by those English Catholics who op
posed the contemporary Papal policies. They disagreed with the
policy of Lord Acton (editor of the Catholic periodical, the
Rambler — The Home and Foreign Review after 1862) #Lioh, in their
opinion, added weight to the popular Liberal dictum (later con
demned by Pius IX in his Syllabus of Errors, 1864) that "the
Roman Pontiff can and ought to reconcile and harmonise himself
with progress, with liberalism, and with modern civilisation."
the policy of Lord Acton and those who supported him aggravated
a condition the Reviewers sought to remedy. This difference in
spirit between the Ultramontane and the Liberal Catholics is men
tioned by Hr. Bales in his consideration of the Lyons Letters.
See Appendix, pp. 67-68.
%arron, "Our foreign Policy", m , XLIX (Feb. 1861), 419.
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that only a small number of the upper classes had joined the revo
lution, or that the elections, by which the great masses of the
people were supposed to have expressed their desires, were nothing
but a farce.

Every conceivable kind of political chicanery bad

been employed by the minority revolutionary party to engineer re
sults favourable to their ends.

Moreover, they had been openly

adopted and supported by the foreign army in possession of the
country, which was itself "commanded by the man to be chosen".*
Yet, exclaims the Review, of this and a great deal more Britain
approves.
It was the purpose of the Review to show "that from the
moment when Plus IX was elected Pope [in 1846], he proceeded in
the course of civil reforms in a manner which ought to [have satis
fied] the most ardent English reformer",* and that had circumstances
but allowed, he would have accomplished his aim.

Within the first

two years of his reign the Pope had granted a free constitution
founded on the British model, appointed Count Rossi, the most
distinguished lay statesman in Italy, as his Prime Minister, and
proposed reforms in every department of internal civil government.*
Plus IX originated the i<ka of a commercial union and a federal
treaty between the various states of Italy, an idea which was ac

*Ibld.. p. 419.
®R. J. Oainsford, "The Roman State", M , LII (April 1883),
80S.
*Ibid., p. 806.
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claimed by his own people and approved by every statesman of the
liberal party.^

That he failed to carry his good intentions into

effect vas no fault of his own.
from a comparison of the civil government of the Pope in
1848 with the civil government of Great Britain immediately prior
to 1832, the Review conduites that the only real difference be
tween the two government* was the power of the latter to control
the threat of revolutionary elements and to complete a gradual
programme of reform.®

But Rome was a weak state, "that on prin

ciple never kept a larger army than was sufficient for the preserva
tion of order under ordinary circumumtanees”:®

it was unable to

withstand the highly organised and skillfully executed work of
those insurgents whose primary object was not reform but overthrow
of the governwnt. Reform was made impossible by the clamour and
violence ensuing from the activities of the Masainians against the
Pope who "feared that his reforms, if quietly accomplished, would
spoil their trade" . C o u n t Rossi, the Prime Minister of the Pope,
was assassinated in the midst of attempting the very thing peace7

Ibid.. p. 506.

®Cf. A. V. Bicey, Lectures on the Relation Between Law
and Public Opinion in Rnglank"'duri % "the NIneteemth Century. (Lon'ëon':"'iÊtecmillan and Co., Ltd., ïiéîlj, pp. 62-210, for the state
of the Constitution and the conditions affecting reform of the
British Government immediately before and after 1832. Cf. also
Hales, Pio Reno, pp. xii-xiii, for primary reasons why the Pope
became an absolutist prince after 1848.
®B*rron, "Our Foreign Policy", DR, XLIX (Feb. 1861), 418.
^%lnsford, "The Roman State", m , LII (April 1863), 507.
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fully »c@o#q*li#h#d by the reformers in Greet Britain after 1832.
For a short period, attempts to bring the civil government into
line with the changing needs of the times had to be abandoned.
Thm confusion aroused by the tesgporary victory of the Hassimians in 1848-1849 resulted in the idea of confederation beiins;
pushed into the background idtere the subsequent ambitions of one
Italian state (Sardinia), anxious only for its own aggrandisement,
further obscured the notion and finally discredited it altogether.
The revolutionists had proclaimed their aim to have been good
government; but their actions refuted their words.

It was the

opinion of the Review that had they genuinely desired reform,
they would have behaved reasonably towards the Pope's attempt to
concede to their demands.

Instead, they had wickedly and wan

tonly destroyed their opportunity.
Reform in Southern Italy was similarly treated and ulti
mately destroyed by insurrection.

Barron describes the manner

in idiich the Reapolitans treated their newly won constitution in
1848 M

follows:

They obstructed every measure by the nest violent
harangues and by endless divisions, to such an ex
tent that all business was brought to a stand still,
idiilst an insurrection was going on in Sicily. The
parliament was pror^i^ued, and the constitution was
virtually destroyed by the men loudest in demanding
free institutions, but mdio proved themselves totally
unqualified for the blessings of liberty. This dis
gusting use made of their newly acquired privileges
deterred the governments of Italy from following up

^^Ibid.. p. 506.
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reform# mud granting furthor libertin# to their
people. It muet he allowed that thie décision was
natural, and the ressens stated in L»rd J^An Rus
sell's despatch, as justifying the revolution,
fall to the ground. If these cssplaints had #my
solid foundation, the people had the power of re
form in their own hands, which they ahandomed, by
choosing as their representatives, men totally
unfitted for such a responsible position.^®
It was believed by some conteaporary critics, among them
Farini, and, as we have observed, has since been upheld by other
historians, that the tide of popularity so favourable to the Pope
in the first two years of his reign received its first real check
on the sppearmnco of his Allocution of April 29, 1842.

13

The

Review went to considerable length to refute the subtle inq>lication that the Pap # was guilty of oscillating between the liberal
and the reactionary camp.

To sanction only a defensive war and

net an offensive one, seemed to the Review to be quite consistent
w»t only with everything said and done previously by the Pope, but
also to be in harmony with the special character of his Sovereignty.
It was moreover a mark of i^lltioal sagacity.

Had the Kiig of

Sardinia adopted a similar policy in the summsr of 1840, he might
have avoided the humiliating defeat of Novara and his own abdica
tion.^*
Agcia,

Pio Noao voturnod to boaoo la 1S80 under tho

protection of French arms, it was asserted that he neglected to
^%arron, "Our Foreign Policy", m , XLIX (Feb. 1861), 420.
^&:f. above, p. 5, n. 5.
^^oainsford, "ihe Roman State", DR. LII (April 1863), 868.
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continue to give full effect to hie echeae of civil r e f o r m . T h e
Review countered that in view of previous circumstances the Pope
was entirely justified in proceeding with the utmost caution.

In

addition to internal pressures he faced the peculiar difficulties
of beii% the centre of intrigues emanating from European nations.
An impossible state of affairs, the Review carefully points out, as
even Lord John once allowed.^*

He had on his return done much, and

continued in his desire to do more; but if the dictates of circum
stances and common sense were to be his guides, further extensive
reform would have to wait until more favourable times.

Meanwhile,

if the power of the Pope was to equal his will, be would have to
have the genuine sympathy and encouragement of Europe.

Before we

pause to deal with the intelligence provided by the Review on this
last point, let us first examine briefly the Review's understanding
of the form and operation of the Papal Government during the years
1830-1859.
It seems the First Lord of the Treasury, Lord Palmerston,
once remarked in parliament that Rome never possessed as good a
government as under the Roman Republic.

According to the Review

this notion was generally accepted as true by the majority of Eng

^®Cf. above, pp. 4-5,
^*finlayson, "The Massacre of Perugia", |R, XLVII (Sept.
1859), 177. See also: Finlayson, "The Government of the Papal
States", M , XLVI (June 1859), 297. There seems to have been an
error in dati:% the former article: the above date (Sept. 1859)
appears at the head of the article in vol. XLVII; but the published
list of articles of the Review bears the date November 1859.
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lishmen as was tbs accompanylag belief that the Papal States were
not only stationary but retrograde; that every concession made by
Plus IX at the beginning of his reign had been rescinded so that
the Papal States had slipped back into the old system of ecclesiastical rule.

17

This, remarks the Review, was slmq?ly not the case.

Pollowing events in 184S, a form of government analogous to that
established by Napoleon III in France was instituted by Pius IX at
Rome, and his Decree of December 31, 1892, presented "pretty nearly
the model of the 'Roman Council of State'".

The same form of con

trol was extended throtghout the provincial and municipal adminis
tration so as to preserve the highest possible degree of municipal
self-government; nor was the system dominated by ecclesiastics.^®
Ranke is quoted in support of their view that "while the Italian
cities early enjoyed municipal privileges, they had never had, and
did not appear to be fitted for, idiat we call political institu
tions."**

The Review contended that much of the misunderstanding

in regard to the nature of liberty in the Papal States lay in the
failure to distinguish between municipal mid political independence. 21

^^Cardinal Wiseman, "Italy and the Papal States”, ITO, XLI
(Sept. 1856), 207. Cf. above, pp. 4-5.
l*Ibid., p. 207.
^*Ibid.. p. 208.
**Finlayson, "Massacre of Perugia”, DR, XLVII (Nov. 1859),
171.
*^Ibid.. p. 171.
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Review was m m h eonoeraed with the repeated charge that
the Pope's governaent was dominated and principally operated by ec
clesiastics to the exclusion of the laity.

One writer, in his at-

te«#t to display the proportion of clergy and laity as well as the
•mount of salaries paid these two classes in the Pope's adminis
tration, summarised an official set of tables drawn up by the Roman
government in 1856 and presented his table to his readers in the
following mannert

MXIflSTRY

MUMBBRS RMmOYRD
Laymen
Clerks

Interior
Finance
Commerce, &,
War
Education

278
7
1
0
3

3,271
3,084
347
125

TOTAL

289

AMOUNT Of SAIARXIB, DOLLARS
Clerks
Laymen

9

110,206
10,329
2,400
0
1,320

637,602
730,268
69,808
51,885
1,824

6,836

134,256

1,491,389

Our author then points out that "of the 289 clerical employes here
set down, 179 were chaplains to prisons, or otherwise employed in
purely ecclesiastical functions."**

We conclude, therefore, that there

were in actual fact 110 clergy holding offices of State as compared
to 6,836 laymen, and that a great deal more of the public money was
paid to the laymen than to the clergy.®®

®®Wisemaa. "Italy end the Papal States", J», XLI (Sept.
1856), 209

.

*®Ibid.. p. 209.
In vindicating the i:#ortaace of the positions held by
ecclesiastics in the Pope's government, finlayson quoted the follow
ing excerpt from an article tAioh appeared in the French journal
Univers:
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In a apaech made by Lord John Russell in the Parliamentary
Session of March 1859 —
Review —

a speech quoted at great length by the

the Minister, in his description of Rosan events before

and after 1848, stated his belief that:
'Before the French Revolution there were municipal
institutions. The people very much governed them
selves. The French destroyed all these municipal
institutions, but they put in their place a good
administration of justice, and what is called an
enlightened despotism. Since 1852 they have neither
municipal institutions nor an enlightened despotism.
They have every kind of corruption and oppression.
If persons are required to pay allegiance they should
receive protection from the Government, and in what
respect is protection more required than in the ad
ministration of justice?'**

'The ecclesiastical element must dominate, and in fact
does dominate, at Bom*. The Pontifical States form the patrimony
of the ^ureh. The cardinals, principal advisers to the Pope,
naturally take part in the government. They constitute the po
litical family of the sovereign, and possess rights claimed else
where by princes of the blood. Amongst them exists the man they
will one day raise to the sovereignty. And it is suggested that
these Princes of the Church should be systematically removed from
public affairs! The idea is Iniquitous and insane. In this case,
secularisation would be meure complete in the Papal States than
anywhere else. The Rsgllsh, warm partisans of Roman secularisa
tion, have a Bishops' Bench in the House of Lords, whilst the con
stitution of 1832 gives a seat in the Senate to our Cardinals.
The first rank, even in political order, cannot be withdrawn
from the mwmbers of the Sacred College at Rome, and they will con
tinue to have ecclesiastics for assistants since they will be suc
ceeded by ecclesiastics. Nevertheless, laymen in the Papal States
are not pariahs ; they have their entry to the Council of Ministers;
they are governors or prefects; they figure in the first rank of
the various public offices, wad take a great share in public in
struction. This, in addition to election functions and the mili
tary career, is sufficient to occupy the activity and satisfy the
legitimate ambition of those who seek to serve their country. To
require more would be to prepare the way for the revolution.' "The
Governmwnt of the Papal States", m , XLVI (June 1859), 312. See
also below, p. 41.
**Finlayson, "The Government of the Papal States”, HR, XLVI
(March 1859), 242.
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We have already nentloaed the Review's objection to the supposed
lack of municipal institutions in the Pw^al States.

The Minister's

ideas on Roman justice were refuted in this particular instance by
citing Pariai, in whose work Finlayson claims, "there is no fact
stated whence it can be inferred that there is not an impartial ad
ministration of justice, and that the persons and property of citisens are not protected.**®®
the authors of the Review considered the following quota
tion and summary testimony of Barron to be a fitting description
of their views on the Roman Government's administration:
'there is no branch of the administration', says
Sir itenry Barron, 'which tto Pope has not reformed
or improved.' And that of the general results?
'There is no people in Burope so lightly taxed,
where education is so carefully attended to, where
the poor are so kindly and paternally provided
for. * He has reduced the duties on foreign e f 
forts, cmmenced three railroads, and completed
one of them; established public bakeries, model
lodging houses, and electric telegraphs; lighted
Rom* with gas (granting a charter for that pur
pose to an English company), constructed new
bridges, viaducts, and roads. He has increased
the custom* receipts during the last few years;
he has increased (he number of lajnmen in the
government; he has added to the public schools
in Rome. Imports and exports increase, depositors

®®Ibid., p. 244. It was a favourite trick of the Reviewers
to bring the testimony of an lulverse witness against the testimony
of another of the earn* kind — as in the case above. Again, an
author adverse to the Papal position might find his own words (in
proper context) used most effectively in contradiction of his own
thesis. Thus we find the liberal historian Farini is often quoted
in refutation of Farint.
Finlayson, ibid., p. 210.
For a description by the Review of the contributions
made by Farini, Balbo, and Qioberti to the attacks on the Papal
Government, see Finlayson, ibid.. p. 205.
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in the Seville ' bank increase • The incos* ex
ceeds the expenditure; «ad the natienal debt is
sc small, that four years' income would pay it
off.®*
We have presented here but an outline of the Review's under
standing of Pius IX's government in the years 1850-1859.

There is

scarcely an argument or speck of evidence efaich was not used by the
authors of the Review in the several means they adopted to meet
what they believed to be vague and unfair charges of: corruption,
inefficiency, failure to administer justice, the inability to pro
tect personal liberty, or the uncertain capacity of the government
to ensure the general welfare of the people.
Such conditions were frequently compared with the actual
workings of the British Oovemment's "own much lauded system";*7
while the considered lack of statistical data, either "conveniently
forgotten or dishonestly suppressed"*® by detractors of the Pope's
government, was answered with a mountain of facts and figures drawn
from official documents.*®

Still further, they attempted to prove

by citing historical authorities such as Ranke, that the rise of
*®Pinlayson, "The Government of the Papal States”, DR,
XLVI (June 1859), 405.
*7g host of the administrative institutions of both these
governments is ecapared in great detail by Finlayson in his articles
on " m # O o v e x -n m e iit o f the PmpoX States", 1», XLVI (Keren 1800),
187-251, and (June 1859), 283-409.
*®B. 8. Purcell, "Papal Allocutions and Revolutionary Prin
ciples", m , LI (Feb. 1862), 203.
*®Cf. ibid.; and Wiseman, "Italy and the Papal States",
DR, XLI (Sept. 1856), 207-226.
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Italy vas not the fall of the Pope, nor the rise of the Pope the
fall of Italy; and generally that not only did the government of
the Pope compare favourably with other governments, but the charges
against the government of the Pope were not "true at all".

There

fore, rather than being one of the worst of governments "it was
probably one of the best".®^
Ve will not pause to question the validity of the evidence
which forms the basis of the Review's cogent arguments;®* such is
beyond the scope of this paper; we shall have to be content with
this very brief summary of their evidence and their conclusions.
We turn now to consider the nature of the relations between Rome
and Europe through 1846-1859 in an effort to describe the Review's
understanding of the support the Pope received from European and
Italian States.

We have mentioned previously the Review's con

sidered need of the Pope for the sympathetic ear of Europe and of
Italy.

But it appears the ruler of the States of the Church was

*®Pinlayson, "The Government of the Papal States", Ml,
XLVI (March 1859), 402. See also " % e Massacre of Perugia"T Ml,
XLVII (Sept. 1859), 170-171.
*^Pinlayson, "The Government of the Papal States”, MR,
XLVI (June 1859), 402.
**Next to the Papal Allocutions and Encyclical Letters
cmaposed by Pius IX and his predecessors, the writers in the Re
view acknowledged their greatest indebtedness to the patient and
painstaking German Catholic historians of the day. Again, promi
nent Catholic laymen such as Reyneval and Maguire wdio were writing
in defence of the Papal position in the 1850's, and the Protestant
historians Ranke and Roaooe, were frequently cited as authorities
in support of their arguments. Cf. Appendix, pp. 67-68.
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quite far removed from the genuine asaiatance of either of these
elements.
England not only abandoned Plus IX but she also became his
enemy by abetting the insurgents and encouraging the ambitions of
an Italian State.

C. S. Purcell wrote:

In the revolutionary wars which desolated Spain
and made Portugal nothing better than a vineyard
for England, Great Britain, by her counsels and
her arms preached the 'sacred right of insurrec
tion* . . . And to-day . . . 'the purest of Ital
ian patriots look upon her as the surest and most
solid support of their work', la the press, in
parliament, by the presence of her fleets, giving
encouragement to the chiefs of anarchy where the
sanguinary struggle rages most, her moral influ
ence is always on the side of the revolution.
But still worse, material assistance is thrown
into the scale. In the battle on the Volturno,
British seamen, on leave of absence from the
fleet in the Bay of Maples, worked Sardinian
guns against the King of the Two Sicilies. And
again, to further the work of the revolution, the
British embassies in the various states of Italy
have for years been engaged in an active revolu
tionary propagandism.33
The reader will recall it was in 1847 that the Government
of Great Britain sent Lord Minto to Italy for the purpose of en
couraging and aiding the Pope in his programme of reform.

But, says

the Beview, the minister was in reality a kind of roving commissioner
who patronised the lowest mob leaders such as Ciceruacchio, and whose
real purpose was to "instigate and encourage insurrection in Italy",

Purcell, "Bonapartism", m , XLIX (Nov. 1880), 118-119. Ac
cording to the Review it would seem that this was the theme of English
foreign policy throughout the period 1848-1861.
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particularly at Rome.®^
In hia analysis of the significance of Roman events in 1848,
Finlayson quotes Montalembert as having said, that not for having
denied liberty or pardon was the Pope persecuted, but because he
refused to sanction war on Austria and thereby preserved his sover
eign neutrality —

a principle peculiar to the special character

of his sovereignty and his purpose on earth as Vicar of Christ.
"The Protestantism of England renders it a moral necessity to re
vile the Papal Government, for if the Pope be antichrist how else
can his rule be otherwise than accurst?"

To the Protestant mind

it is essential, concludes Finlayson, that the "'Papal Government
be the weakest and worst in Europe'" and to doubt the validity of
this charge repeatedly dinned into British ears by the Times, Ex
eter Hall, Lord Shaftesbury and Sardinia, was "to display the spirit
of a sceptic".

It would appear Finlayson believed a jealousy of

the Pope's spiritual power, coupled with a desire to curb his po
litical influence so as to cripple his spiritual supremacy, marked
the real basis of Anglo-Roman relations.

36

Nor did the Review con

sider such objects as these to be historically unique.

As early as

1683, they say, the principles of a politico-religious No Popery
domestic and foreign policy developed under Charles II.

"This

^^Barron, "Our Foreign Policy", m , ELI* (Feb. 1869), 418.
Cf. Trevelyan, Garibaldi's Defence of the Roman Republic 1848-9, p. 73.
36
Cf. above,?. 5, n. 5. See also p. 30, and below, pp. 50-51.
®®Finlaysoa, "The Government of the Papal States", BR, XLVI
(June 1859), 284-285.
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double policy", wrote Russell (? McCsbe), "may be described in two
words: the foreign policy has been 'Anti-Papal*, the domestic, 'AntiSocial.

This same object, implicit in the English aid to Anti-

Catholic rebels in the Netherlands, Scotland, and France during the
llisabethan Reign, bore a marked resemblance in form and character
to that which appeared in the encouragement to the rebels in Spain,
Portugal, and Italy during the long reign of Lord Palmerston.

37

Instead of supporting the Pope in his attempts to reform
his government, Gainsford maintained that
% e policy of England seems to have been so to use
its influence as to deprive the Pope of the power
of doing anything, and then — to tell him to do
everything. What the Pope wants is — not the will,
but the power. They who really wish him to effect
certain measures of reform, should by every means
in their power strengthen his position, discourage
the agitators against him, and tell them plainly
that civil reforms cannot be prudently or properly
conceded to pressure either internal or external,
but must be granted freely . . . Let the Pope only
be treated as fairly as the iultan, and then we
have no doubt of the result. We have backed up
the Turk against internal insurrection: we have
spent our blood and treasure to protect the Turk
trtm external attack.
How, under similar circum
stances, have we treated the Pope? Not a man has
turned traitor to the Pope with either sword, pen,
or tongue, that has net been encouraged by England
to do so, and probably would not have done so but
for that encouragement.38
Thus explains the Review. England did everything in her power
to paralyse the efforts of a genuine reformer and all because he hap-

^^Dr. C. Russell (? McCabe), "Recent Writers on the Temporal
Sovereignty of the Pope", m , ELI (Dec. 1856), 351.
3%ainsferd, "The Roman State", DR, LII (April 1863), 666,
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pened to be I^pe.
If the Pope suffered from the interference of England, the
Review felt the Papal position was undermined to an even greater
extent by the combined efforts and disinterested desires of still
other great powers who wished to strengthen (?) his temporal domin
ion.

The real object of Protestant Prussia and schismatic Russia,

for example, was to subvert the temporal dominion in order to des
troy the spiritual supremacy; while Gallican France, "all but schis
matic", and Josephist Austria, "still labouring under the old antipapal regime”, sought the subversion of the Pope's domain in order
that his supremacy might "be exercised in subserviency to their
will".®®

These secret aims were believed to be particularly evi

dent in the celebrated Memorandum addressed to the Pope by these
five great powers in 1831.

40

The adoption of the recommendations

suggested in the Memorandum would have eventually resulted in the
complete loss of the Pope's domain.
For what but that could be the result of these
measures, 'That the laity should be generally
®®Finlayson, "The Government of the Papal States", OR, XLVI
(March 1889), 288.
*^In 1831, an insurrection in the Papal States which was put
down with the aid of Austria and France ended in a conference of
Ambassadors at Rome for the purpose of discussing reform in the Papal
States. Though the Memorandum containing the suggestions of the Am
bassadors was opposed by the Pope and by Metternieh, and only par
tially implemented, it provided a rallying cry for the revolution
ists and reformers. Moreover, the nature of the Austrian and French
interference (with Britain in the background) meant that the States
of the Pope would henceforth be the centre of the European struggle
between these two champions of legitimacy and of liberalism.
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admitted to administrative and judicial functions?'
Generally, that is, in the superior offices; for,
as Parini himself informs us, they already were in
the inferior. And with lay ministers of state
around him what would become of the Papal Govern
ment? especially as, combined with this demand for
lay administration was another of these disinterest
ed counsels, viz., that there should be «Aat is
called 'constitutional government', i.e., a general
system of representative Institutions, not only
municipal councils elected by the people, but pro
vincial councils, 'to assist' the governors of the
provinces, and 'with suitable powers', 'to be con
sulted on the most important affairs.'^1
In addition to continually reminding their readers of the
vague nature of the complaints against the Renan governawnt, the
Review also emphasizes the deep wad vivid sense of foreign inter
vention apparently felt by these saaw people who were overly criti
cal of the Pope's administration. These interventions, it is ex
plained, were occasioned by upset conditions which resulted from
the corrupting influence of French revolutionary principles and
the oppressive nature of Austrian interference: that is to say,
the powers who came to put down disorders were themselves greatly
responsible for those disorders.

Rome's reliance on Austria, which

had come about through the disturbances of the French revolution
and Napoleonic Wars, had led to the association of the Roman Govern
ment with the despotism of Austria.

But, Finlayson tells us, in

March 1854, at the very time this unhappy association was being
formed in the minds of Italians, the Pope himself was suffering,

^^Finlayson, "The Government of the Papal States'*, DR,
XLVI (March 1859), 286.
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as law had suffered before him, under the heel of Austrian des
potism: and that mo other thing "was so mischievous to Papal Au
thority" as this aggressive intermingling of Austria in the Papal
States.

42

In support of his view of Austrian ambition, Finlayson

quotes the following "curious" passive from one of Farlni's works:
'It cannot be doubted that Austria had from a remote
date desired to extend her sway to the four Pontifi
cal Legations, that she had studied the means of ac
quiring then in 1815, and still cherished the hope
of doing so. Accordingly her official servants mur
mured against clerical government, and drew compari
sons to its extreme disadvantage with the government
of Lombardy.' (p. 87). 'Austria wished Europe to
understand that the government of the Pope was feeble
and in its dotage, and that her troops were indis
pensable to keep in order the unruly inhabitants of
the Legations.' (p. 83).*®
The cause of Italian Independence had interested Louis
Napoleon at a very early % e in his career.

But in the light of

the evidence of the Review the nature of his interest as Emperor
of the French did little to enhance the real safety of Papal rule
in Italy.
broken —
field —

The Emperor believed "the power of Austria must be
in Italy he would find a pretext of war and a battle
in Sardinia am obedient ally, and in the revolution a

ready tool".**

The spirit of nationalism supplied him in his need

for a war cry.

The Emperor know he would have to break with the

Pope if he were to accoi^lish his aim of bringing glory to the

*®Ibld.. pp. 205-208.
‘*®IbW., p. 228.
**Purcell, "Bonapartism", BR, XLIX (Nov. 1860), 124.
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of France as well as that of fulfilling his own desire for
territorial aggrandisement.
The French troops sent to restore the Papal Oovemment in
1848 remained in Rome until 1870 where they prevented the free ex
ercise of Papal authority; at the same time they acted as a chief
instrument for the spread of French revolutionary principles among
the Roman citizens.

Yet, remarked the Review, while the French

and English emissaries helped incite rebellion by their presence
and propaganda, they condemned and undermined attempts by the Pope
to suppress revolt.

It would seem they considered such action un

becoming a Pontiff and examples of the aggressive nature of his
Government.**
In June 1859, there appeared the pamphlet of the French
Eaperor, "Napoleon 111 and Italy".

Directed from Paris toward

Vienna, it was a crude version of the secret Pact of Plombiers;
and it contained, among other things, three "considerable diffi
culties" vAose settlement the Emperor considered essential for the
proper reform of the Papal Government:
*1. To reconcile the regime of the Church with
a legal, political, and regular regime in the Roman
States.
*2. To render the Pope independent of questions
of nationality, of war. of armaments, of internal
and external defence.
*3. To constitute a native army, and to substi-

*®lbid.. p. 124.
*®Finlayson, "The Massacre of Perugia”, DR, XLVII (Sept.
1859), 174-175.
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tute for our occupation the protection of an effi
cacious and real Italiaa force.
'This is a threefold necessity, which, under
pain of certain and perhaps approaching disturbance,
must be satisfied, in the interest of Italy, of re
ligion, and of all the Catholic States.'*?
The objects of these suggestions were observed by the Review to be
no different from those aimsd at by the first Napoleon in 1791, by
the Great Powers in 1831, and by Napoleon III in 1848.

Hence, de

spite an accompanying suggestion of setting up a Confederation of
Italiaa States with the Pope as its Head, the same old questions
remained unanswered and the real object continued to be that of re
lieving the Pope of his rule over the States of the Church.
It was the argument of the Review that as early as 1848
Sardinia conspired against the security and integrity of the Ital
ian states.

Her cabinet, parliament, press, and refugees, all con

tributed to a policy which kept Italy in a constant turmoil through
the years 1848-1881.*®

Even the French pamphlet "Napoleon III and

Italy" was compelled to admit that the policy of Piedmont was "an
encouragement to revolutionary passions and embarrassawnt to con
sciences and a real and grave danger not only to Piedmont but to
Italy and the whole of lurope".*®
In his article concerning the ecclesiastical affairs of the

*?Flnlayson, "The Government of the Papal States", DR, XLVI
(June 1859), 303.
*®Ibid.. p. 238.
*®Purcell, "Bollinger and the Temporal Power of the Popes",
m , L (May 1881), 220.
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states of the House of Savoy and their relation to the Holy See,
Bowyer attempts to prove false the assumptions that in the Sardin
ian states a Protestant reformation vas going on and that the body
of the nation, headed by its king and parliament, were engaged in
a struggle for independence against the Holy See and against the
clergy of the Catholic Church.

Bovyer points out that these same

notions were rooted in Bnglish public opinion and even supported by
statesmen in both Houses of Parliament.

According to his evidence

the defeat of Sardinia at Novara in 1848 resulted in the revolution
ary party's rise to powr.

Though peace brought the people, the

nobility, and the clergy mgainst this party, they succeeded in
maintaining their position by virtue of their control of key govern
ment positions, of the press, and of their encouragement to the
secret societies.

Still they feared the power of the church and

they therefore launched a campaign which shortly took on the aspects
of an attack against the church and the Holy See.

They realised,

however, that direct attacks leading to a breach with the Holy See
would be regarded unfavourably by the great body of the nation;
therefore, they professed deference to Rome and a wish to do nothing
violating the rights of the Church; they pretended to obtain their
desires through negotiation and consent of the Pope.

But, accused

Bowyer, in their negotiations with Rose the Sardinian ministers
"declared negotiations to be going on where none whatever were in
fact being carried out: ambassadors were not instructed to proceed
with business on which they publicly professed to have sent [them];
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or [they wore] instructed to proceed with business demands which
they knew could not be co«#lled with".

All this, reports Botyer,

was for the purpose of bemusing the people and deluding Europe so
as to give weight to the opinion that co»#rwnlse with Borne was im
possible, that the Holy See was deaf to argument, heedless of the
demands of circumstance and the need sometimes to admit reasonable
so
concessions.""

The severe treatment of those she opposed the schemes

of the Sardinian ministers, a "severity which would have been called
tyranny and cruelty in another less favourite state**, was applauded
in England and on the continent as proof of the energy of a "socalled constitutional government".®^
In this cursory description of events and conditions in the
Roman States through the period 1846-18S9 we have attempted to give
some of the reactions of the Review to the "two motives" laid down
by Lord John Russell in stating the cause of the revolutionary party.

52

Finlayson sums up the argument as follows:
[To foreign aggression and intrigue] mere than to
any other cause, except the kindred causes of the
French Revolution and Josephist despotism in Aus
tria, are to be ascribed those intrigues in Italy
and those discontents and disturbances which are,

®®«ir G. Bowyer, **Rome and Sardinia", BR, XXXIX (Sept. 1855),
164-199.
®^iseman, "Italy and the Papal States", OR, ELI (Sept. 1857),
180,
®®See above. Lord John's despatch of October 1860, pp. 20-21.
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with such satire igaorsaoe of history, attributed to
Papal aisffovemneat.®®
It would seem then, according to the Review, that the real
difficulty of the Papal Government lay not in its misgovernment but
in its struggle against Prance on the one hand and Austria on the
other as each vied with the other for dominance in the peninsula.
Nor, m

we have been asked to observe by the Review, was this the

only difficulty facing the Pope because of external pressures.

Sar

dinia used both Prance and Austria to advance her own desire to be
come a power; and always at the additional expense of the Papacy.
But we have only touched the heart of the problem of the
Pope's temporal sovereignty —

a problem of the utmost importance

trtm the viewpoint of the Dublin Review. Per in addition to the
various aspects of the attacks on the Pope's sovereignty that we
have already mentioned, there remains to be considered still another
approach taken by those # o would have seen the Pope relieved of
his embarrassment of temporal rule.

The Review says:

. . . those enemies of the Papacy maintain that the
independence of the Qburch, as typified by the sover
eignty of the Pope, is incompatible with the indepen
dence of the Gommomwalth, whatever be its form —
an Expire, a Xingdom, an Oligarchy, or a Republic;
that no Ration cam be great, no People happy, and
no Ruler free, vAere the Church is not an instrument
itt the hands of the State — a College rather than
a Church — and those idio preside over its flocks,
and serve at its altars appointed by, or under the
direct control of the State.
According to them the claims of the Papacy are

®3pittlayson, "The Government of the Papal States", DR, XLVI
(March 1809), 200.
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'unfounded', and the exercise of its powers, at
home and abroad, a downright mischief. The tempo
ral sovereignty of the Pope rests, they say, on
no solid basis; the spiritual supremacy of the
Pope in all lands, outside the Papal States, is,
they affirm, the cause of evils innumerable to
those who govern, and those who are governed.®*
This view, which was evidently shared by the governments
of England, France, Prussia, Austria, and Sardinia,®® explains to
the Review at least one of the reasons why these governments de
sired to treat the problem of temporal sovereignty as a purely po
litical question.

The writers in the Review objected to this on

the ground that to distinguish sharply between the temporal power
and the spiritual power so as to relegate the latter to matters of
conscience alone was to pervert the very nature and purpose of the
Church.
80

As religion is concerned with every act of the individual,

it is interested in the affairs of nations and their governments.

The Church insists upon the supremacy of God over man, of the soul
over the body; the Pope could never admit to the subserviency of re
ligion to human institutions, the supremacy of the world over the
Church.®®

Rather, he would forever strive to maintain temporal in

dependence and to exert the greatest possible m>ral influence and

®’*Russell <? McCabe), "Recent writers on the Temporal Sover
eignty of the Pope", m , XLI (Dec. 1856), 348-349. Cf. Trevelyan,
Garibaldi's Defence of the Roman Republic, p. 59.
®®Finlayson, "The Government of the Papal States", I», XLVI
(March 1859), 284.
fis
Russell (? McCabe), "Recent Writers on the Temporal Sover
eignty of the Pope", DR, XLI (Dec. 1886), 346.
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authority over civil and political interest#. Henee, the practical
importance of the temporal sovereignty which secured the complete
autonomy of the Papacy and the exercise of spiritual supremacy;®?
its overthrow would weaken the organization of the Church and crip
ple its power of resistance.

Temporal sovereignty, therefore, could

not be treated as a purely political question as it existed for the
sake of the spiritual supremacy alone.®*
Thus, according to the Review, the peculiar character of
the Papal sovereignty, the interdependence of the spiritual power
and temporal power of the Pope, called for an independent Papal
State.

The Pope required complete tei^>oral independence from the

Princes of Europe and, by the same token, he also required complete
civil freedom in his own state —

he could not "'be the subject of

his own people'".®*
Thus far we have presented three of the arguments of the
Review in answer to the charge that ecclesiastical absolutism was
being maintained by the Pope despite the reasonable demands of
progress for a constitutional form of government.

First, the Revolu

tion in 1848 had revealed the absence of a class of men to whoa po-

®?It is important to note that the Review considered the
temporal sovereignty to be in no way an essential part of tho idoa
of the Pope's position as head of the Oiurch. Russell, "Dr. Del
linger's Protestantism and the Papacy", % , LII (April 1863), 472.
®*Purcell, "Sicily, the Italian Revolution and the Papacy",
m , LI (May 1862), 507.
®*Finlayson, "The Government of the Papal States", M , XLVI
(March 1858), 230.
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litieal power could bo trusted as well as having proved Rome a weak
state unable to withstand the work of insurrectionists and foreign
intrigue; thus, a programme of gradual reform bad been rendered im
possible.

Second, the far from disinterested pressure brought to

bear on the Pope by Prance, Austria, and Sardinia (not to mention
England) throughout the entire period 1846-1859, only served to il
lustrate the revelations of the Revolutionary era.

Third, the pecul

iar character of the Papal State, the interdependence of the spirit
ual power and the temporal power called for the investiture of su
preme political authority in the Pope.

His government was neces

sarily a Theocracy.
In his article "The Italian Revolution —

Its Cause and Char

acter", Purcell directs the reader who would find the truly basic
cause for the disturbances in the Peninsula to an examination of
the ndnd and the character of the Italian people.

In the north of

Italy, where the bold and unscrupulous ambition of the professional
class existed beside the "thinly disguised Voltarism" of the nobil
ity and irikere both these were conjoined with the traditional monar
chical sentiment of the people, there was sufficient strength and
unity for the formation of a powerful state.

But, in Central and

South Italy, where ancient local traditions, "the necessity of Papal
Sovereignty", the intense traditional pride of its several ancient
cities and the topography of the l«md divided the peninsula into
distinct regions, the argument in favour of small republics or muni
cipalities far outweighed that in support of one vast government for
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the entire peninsula.Hoeever, or so it seems, Italy in 1859 har
boured the same spirit of rebellion against tradition and authority
as that which characterised France in 1793.

And yet, Purcell ex

plains:
The growth of the revolutionary principle and the
spread of the doctrines of Massini are not enough
in themselves to account for the change that is come
over the minds of men, and for the upheaving of those
passions which are now shaking Italiaa society to its
centre. Make that abatements we will from the record
ed suffrage of the Italiaa people, strike off those
nuawrotts votes that have been obtained by bribery and
intimidation, and make a still larger deduction on the
score of the miserable cowardice manifested in every
village and hamlet and borough of the revolted states
by the friends of faith and loyalty, and reduce yet
again that majority, swelled to its vast dimensions
by the falsification of the election returns and yet,
after all these necessary abatements and allowances,
we are bound in the interests of truth to confess
that large and active masses of the Italian popula
tions, in spite of their ancient traditions, and of
their historical recollection, and in spite of their
wonted reverence for religion, have deliberately
chosen to cast in their lot with the excommunicated
kizg of Sardinia.*!
Nevertheless, we are told it was a vain hope to seek a
restoration of Italy to her forsMr glory in the rise of a united
nation.

"Patience and self-denial, civil courage and military valour,

habit of association, and reverence for monarchical authority are not
the most distinguishing qualities for political pre-eminence."*®

**Purcell, "Bonapartism", m , XLIX (Nov. 1860), 135.
Purcell, "The Italian Revolution —
ter", m , XLVIII (May 1860), 158-159.

Its Cause and Charac

*®lbid., p. 160.
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Divided by geography and hereditary fends Italy had ever been a land
of cities; she had never been a nation; neither her tradition nor the
character of her people fitted her for the role.

Yet, under the

leadership of a few, endowed with faith, boldness, ambition and tire
less energy, Italy cried out for liberation, not for love of liberty,
said Purcell, but for the sake of a Utopia envisioned in a United
Kingdom.

Nevertheless, despite the fact that the Italiaa expects

his kingdom to have p o m r and influence, he will not stir himself to
accomplish it.

This infirmity, Purcell believed, was the key to the

mystery of the Italian position.

In 1860 she welcomed the sword of

Victor IDnaanuel; before, she welcomed the sword of the French; and
before that, the sword of the Archduke John of Austria with its
promise to free Italy frmn the first Napoleon.

Ve have not seen,

Purcell concludes, the last of this habitual yielding of Italy to
external pressure.
According to the Review, Papal administration and the special
character of the Pope's Sovereignty should not have been held res
ponsible for a part in the upset conditions of Italy through 18461896.

"'If agitation be still kept up, the cause will be found in

the character of the nation itself, and its ambitious views directed
to unattainable objects.*”®®
Here ends our summary of the Italian Question and the Papal
position as understood by the Dublin Review.

From this same view

%arron, "Our Foreign Policy in 1860-61", DR, XLIX (Feb.
1861), 421,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

54

point, let ue now glenoe briefly et the besie of Lord John's moral
support of the Italian Revolutionary party in 1860-1861.
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Ill
t m w JOHN RHSSIHJ.*8 FORIION POLICY, 1860-1861
AND THE DUBLIN BBVIBW

It seemed to the Review that some very important features
of Lord John's Italian policy were completely inconsistent.

While

Her Majesty's government supported revolution in Italy with one
hand, she was arming her other against the threat posed by the chief
of revolution, Napoleon 111, in France.!

Yet by its very nature,

Purcell stated, revolution does not mean to be confined.

If its

success be permitted in Italy, "the triumph of Bonapartism will not
be long delayed in Europe."*

Barron, mho shared Purcell's thought,

reminded his readers that Britain herself had not been without her
share of hot-headed theorists, and this same country which had helped
pull down the oldest sovereignty in Europe held no solid reason why
she might not also be faced by a revolt against Queen and Country.
He inquires further, "does not the dispatch of 27th October hold
out every inducement" and lend the highest English authority to
this very element in British society?®

!pureell, "Bwaapartism", DR, ELIX (Nov. 1860), 144.
Barron, "Our Foreign Policy", DM, XLIX (Feb. 1861), 428.

Cf.

®Purcell, "Bonapartism", DM, XLIX (Nov. 1860), 143.
Barren, "Our Foreign Policy", m,"%,IX (Feb. 1861), 432.

Cf.

®Barron, "Our Foreign Policy", BE, XLIX (Feb. 1861), 432-433.

88
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It will be remembered Lord John bed declined to interfere
with Qeribeldi'e oroseing the Strait* of Messina and had approved
annexation of Tuscany by Sardinia because of his belief that, in
Italy, questions of territorial circumspection were mixed up with
questions of internal government.

The Review objected.

The an

nexation of Nice and Savoy by France, which the Foreign Minister
had most emphatically denounced as a violation of the rights and
limits of other nations,* was no different in principle from Sar
dinian seimure of Tuscany or the Romagna.
same utump of foreign aggression.

Both instances showed the

Moreover, Sardinia had no closer

relation to the Peninsular states than did France or the rest of
the European community.

Sardinia, therefore, had no more right to

the Romagna than France had to the ancestral seat of the King of
Sardinia.®

We have already mentioned our authors' unwillingness

to attribute any value to the plebiscites which bad apparently
shown Savoy and the country of Nice begging "to be annexed to im
perial and despotic France".

We will pursue this subject no fur

ther.®
The Review was quite in agreement with the several leading
States of Europe who had protested and denounced the King of Sar-

*Cf. above, pp. 14-18.
®Gainsford, "The Roman State", m , LII (j^»ril 1862), 503-504.
®Cf. above, pp. 26-27. See also Purcell, "Bonpartism", I».
KLIX (Nov. 1860), 131-133, 140; and "The Italian Revolution — Its
Cause and Character", m , XLVIII (May 1860), 154-155.
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dlaia's Invasion of the Papal States without causus belli.?

His at

tack on a neighbouring sovereign with whom he was at peace was a
complete violation of international law.

His joining of the revolu

tionary party gathered there from several nations to promote insur
rection "'no longer allowed Europe to regard him as a stranger to
the movement which had upset the Peninsula'".*
Victor Emmanuel had far surpassed the violation of law and
of order committed by William 1X1.

Moreover, Lord John's citation

of Vattel was inaccurate and not a valid corroboration of his stand.
"In the first place, Lord John adroitly evaded the question of 'good
reasons’ stated by Vattel.

Every man who enters into a rebellion

believes that he has 'good reasons.'"

It was not Vattel's meaning

that the decision to take up arms should be left to the people.
Otherwise, the Canadian Rebellion, or the Irish Rebellion might have
been similarly defended and their leaders might have claimed the sup
port of foreign powers on the same grounds.®

Barron applied this

argument used by Lord John in defence of the Italian insurrection
to the problems of British rule in India.
The People of Naples (Delhi?) have chosen a king
by universal suffrage. They vote the expulsion of

^Cf. above, p. 20.
*This is taken from the Russian Government's despatch to its
minister at TUrin on ieptember 28 (Oct. 10), 1860. This despatch,
as well as similar expressions by the foreign Office of Paris and of
Austria, are quoted at length by Barron, "Our Foreign Policy", I»,
XLIX (Feb. 1861), 422-425.
®Barron, "Our Foreign Policy", DR, XLIX (Feb. 1861), 425.
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Bourbons and Austrinns (English?). Thus in the
words of Lord John Russell, — 'Upon this grave
matter, her majesty's government hold that the
people in question (of Delhi) are themselves the
best judges of their own affairs. Her majesty's
government do not feel justified in declaring
that the people of southern Italy (Delhi) had not
good reasons for throwing off their former (Brit
ish) government.'!*
He believed this parallel to be perfect and inquired whether
Britain was to hold "two separate sets ofprinciples",this time,
"one for India and another for Italy.

If the argument is sound for

Italy it is equally sound for India."

But, our critic concludes, the

principle is unsound in either case; it upsets the foundations of
all govenwents and, if upheld, would lead to anarchy all over the
world.

Moreover, not one state in Europe agreed with Lord John's

interpretation of Vattel nor did any one of them consider the opin
ions of Vattel as the law for their community of nations.
The same author further emphasises the inconsistencies of
Lord John's policy by comparing as follows two short extracts taken
from the Minister's despatches dated 31 August and 27 October, 1860:
'For they (the English govermaent) conceived that
in substance that note (Ocunt Cavour's Note) dis
avowed any intention of attacking the domains of
the Emperor of Austria or the king of Naples'. But
the king of Sardinia has attacked the
domains of
the king of Naples.
Them it is quite
clear that
the 'substance* of the note has been violated. How
will honest plain-spoken Englishmen, or future his
torians, reconcile this violation of a solemn pledge,
by a king, given through his prime minister, with
the no less solemn approval of Lord John Russell,
given in these m»rds, (dispatch. October 27,) —

!®Ibid.. p. 430.
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'Her mejeety's government cannot therefore blame
the king of Sardinia for asaiatlng them,' (the
revolutionary party) by violating the territory
of the king of Haplea, at the head of hia army.
The failure of Lord John to blame the King of Sardinia for break
ing his pledged word and forfeiting his honour prompted Barron to
conclude that this must be "a new principle in diplomacy".Ü
As we might guess, the authors of the Review did not share
Lord John's opinion that the Italian Revolution had been "conducted
with singular temper and forbearance”. Rather, in light of their
remarks, the oaiqiaiga conducted by Victor Emmanuel's general Cialdini was a particularly sanguinary affair and Garibaldi's adventure
appears to have been no less blameworthy.!®

Though Cialdini's forces

were three times those under the command of the Pope's general Laaoriei«»re, he incited his troup to give no quarter to the Papal army and,
it appears, he bombarded Ancona "for twelve hours, after all firing
had ceased frmm the town, and at a time when he knew that conditions

ü l b i d .. p. 431.
!*It seems that in addition to the property Victor Emmanuel
himself had confiscated, the Sardinian Monarch had sanctioned acts
of spoliation by Garibaldi. "By a decree of Garibaldi, the Dicta
tor of Naples, the private property of the royal family, amounting
to 25 millions of francs, in the Neapolitan funds, and comprising
the dowry of the queen, the portions of the royal princesses, and
the fortunes of the royal cadets, were summarily confiscated.
A
commission was appointed to distribute this money among the patriots
who had suffered for their country.” Purcell, "Bonpartism", DR,
XLIX (Nov. 1860), n. 142. The fate of the Irish prisoners at Genoa
prompted the Review to give "on official authority” a description
of the prisoners•' cruel treatment" by the "model government” of
Sardinia. See Barron, "Our foreign Policy”, I», XLIX (Feb. 1861),
426-427.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

60

of sttrrender were under dleeussloa between the Sardinian admiral
and the besieged".

Farther atrocities, we are told, were committed

by the same force on its entry into Neapolitan territory.
Thus, Barron concludes, international law was set at naught;
promises were broken; pledged honour was violated; and the principles
of public and private property were treated with contumacy.!®

All

was ^ n e in the name of liberty and all received the unqualified
approbation of Lord John Russell.

But, Barron exclaims, the main

object of Lord John was not to promote liberty.

The policies of

the British ministers, aided by the daily press!* and the insti

l*Ibid.. p. 482.
!*0n innumerable occasions the contributors to the Review
were most outspoken in their criticism of what they considered
false reporting of the Italiaa Question by British daily newspapers,
periodicals and learned journals. It had, for example, very little
regard for the T i w s . and even the Catholic Rambler did not escape
the biting criticisms of its writers. The Tablet seems to have been
the one paper with a tenacity of principle sufficient to preserve
it against "the delusive liberalism of the day”. Purcell, "Dellinger
and the Temporal Power of the Popes", m , L (May 1861), 199.
"No
one", Wiseman said, "has ever found our daily press hard upon a
protestant State, whatever be its violation of constitutions, or its
religious persecutions." Wiseman, "Italy and the Papal States",
DR. XLI (Sept. 18S6), 182. Gainsford remarked, "the correspondent
of the Tlsms writes that 'the Italian political atmosphere is filled
with lies*, and we fear that the correspondence from Italy, in the
column of that and some other papers, savours strongly of the atmos
phere whence it comes." Gainsford, "The Roman State", m , LII (April
1803), 604. In on# plmo# th# Review telle of iaetenoee of completely
false reports which, though later proved as false, were never pub
lished as such in Ragland; see Wiseman, "Italy and the Papal States",
Wl, XLI (Sept. 1856), 177. The Review itself was generally regarded
all over the world as being notoriously partisan because of "its
[admitted] attachment to the person of the Rely Father, its fidelity
to every doctrine, usage, and feeling of the Roman Church".
Ibid..
P. 206.
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gators of tho satl-Gatholie party!® ia the United Kingdom, hod won
considershle sympathy for the esnse of Italian patriots in the minds
of a great many Englishmen.

To approve the efforts and the sueooss

of Italian insurgents was to flatter the sentimints of a large por
tion of the British populace.

The despatch of October 27, 1860,

had sprung from the same ground and was part of the same policy
which had dictated the Durham Letter in 1860; its message was quite
in harmony with the Minister's habit of taking advantage of popular
sentiments to court popularity.!®
As we direct our attention toward the basic differences be
tween the positions adopted by Lord John Russell and the Dublin
Review it is no surprise to find their premises absolutely opposed.
Lord John's chief interest in the Italian question sprang from his
view of the causes and ccmeoaltant circumstances of the Revolution
in I860.!?

His support of the insurgents and the King of Sardinia

flowed naturally from bis desire to see the Italian people rid of

!®A particularly good instance of the Review's opinions in
regard to this point will be found in Russell (7 McCabe), "Recent
Writers on the Temporal Sovereignty of the Pope", DM, XLI (Bee. 1856),
n., 349-351. Dr. Russell (? McCabe) describes the work of the Ox
ford Italian Professor, Aurelio Saffi, a member of the Roman Trium
virate in 1849, and whom Russell considers "a fitting professor of
that 'national religion', Which Anglicanism has been seeking to im
port into Italy".
!®Barron, "Our foreign Policy", m , XLIX (Feb. 1861), 430.
The Durham Letter was written by Lord John Bussell to the Bishop of
Durham in lëW.' ' In it the minister lent his voice to the cries
against "Papal Aggression" which greeted the attempt of Pius IX to
re-establish the Catholic Hierarchy of Xngland on his return from
exile at Gaeta in 1849.
!?Cf. above, pp. 20-22.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

62

misgovernment sad of nisohievous foreign Influence in order that
they might build up the edifice of their liberties, «md consolidate
their work of independence,

la fine, the Italian Question for him

was a political question; a question which involved political prin
ciples of the highest order and of the greatest importance to all
Englishmen,

light seeks before he wrote his despatch of 27 October,

he had written to Lord Blogmfield at Berlin:
'I wish to put in a caveat against the indiscrim
inate use of the serds 'revolution* and 'revolutionary'.
*A revolution may be the greatest of calamities;
it may be the highest of blessings. In England the
phrases 'the Revolution,' 'from the time of the Revol
ution, ' 'the Government which has prevailed from the
period of the Revolution,' are terms which are ap
plied to the change from subserviency to France, and
the arbitrary tyranny of our pensioned Stuarts to
national independence and the rule of law and liberty,
#kich began to prevail under William III. and the
Rouse of Banover.
'In France the term 'Revolution' is generally ap
plied to the democratic anarchy of the Jacobin con
vention.
'The servile parties on the Continent are apt to
use the term indiscriminately, and the advocates of
absolutism speak with as much abhorrence of a change
from the worst despotism to the prevalence of the law
of order, as of a change from a mild Government to
democratic licence. Thus the change from government
smintaiaed by torture to a free and regular govern
ment is called a 'Revolution'; but such a change, by
whatever name it may be called, is a blessing and
not a calamity.'!*
The interest of the Review in the Italiaa Question was de
rived frws its desire to help preserve the Temporal Sovereignty of
the Pope.

Its authors believed there was a case for the Roman

!*Walpole, Life of Lord John Russell, II, 327.
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Goverimeat at the time

of tho Revolution in I860, and that not only

was Lord John's policy

inconsistent hut it was alliedwith the powers

and principles which threatened the true basis of all society and
government.

In their answers to the charge of Papal misrule, the

authors of the Review were arguing not only for the right of the
Holy See to possess territory and its ability to govern its States;
but they were also claiming the right of the Church to exist as a
corporate and independent body.!®

However, in the final analysis,

the Review believed that above all else the attack on Rome was an
attempt to itostroy thespiritual fortress which barred the path to
a new way of life.

The Pope's worst enemies were those who preached

the inexorable march Of progress, the m>ral authority of majorities,
and the omnipotence of the state.

Purcell wrote:

In the Italy of to-day, almost without disguise we
come upon that trinity of evil which characterised
the French revolution — pride, self-love, and dis
obedience — laid down «w» a rule of life.
Modern civilisation preaches a new morality as well
as a new gospel, in idiioh injustice crowned with
success is a virtue, wad robbery on a grand scale,
or ia pursuit of an idea is reckoned a merit.
la
this new code of morals, to rectify a frontier or
to create an empire 'a terrible war, a war to the
death, a war to the knife', is accounted justifiable.
In our age, says this new nwrality, if we much want
a thing that is rightfully in another's possession,
or if we fancy we could make a good use of it in our
grand schemes of ambition, have we the power and
audacity sufficient, we do well to seise it. 'In
our age', says the most systematic apostle of the
new gospel in his letters just given to the world,

!®Cf. above, pp. 49-50.
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*ï
audâeity is the best policy; it did
good to Napoleon.* Such a rule deserves such an
illustration. % e minor virtues, such as truth
fulness, fair dealing, frankness, modesty, and com
mon honesty, and the sentiment of honour, are al
together omitted from the cede of this new civili
sation. ’Could then,’ says Pius IX . in a recent
allocution, ’the Sovereign Pontiff extend a friendly
hand to a civilisation of this kind, could be sin
cerely make a league and bond with it?’ Let things
be called by their true names, and the Boly See
will appear always consistent with itself. In
reality it has been in all times the protector
and initiator of true civilisation.
The writers in the Review desired to defend the government
of Rome and the principles of Rome from the viewpoint of Rome itself;
and, they were in accord with Papal political principles, though oc
casionally in error with regard to the political manoeuvers conducted
by Pius XX and Cardinal Rntoaelll.

Strict adherence to their re

ligious convictions and the theological tenets of the Church lent
a si%ular consistency to their arguments and produced a remarkable
degree of agreement between their separate treatments of the various
problems raised by the Italian Question and Lord John's foreign policy.
Both in their condemnation of the conduct and of the aims of the risorgimento, as well as in their refutation of the new philosophy of
progress, apparently embraced by Lord John, these critics spoke from
a Papal position and in some instances anticipated Papal pronounce
ments.®^

*®Purcell, "Papal Allocutions and Revolutionary Principles",
m , LI (Feb. 1862), 206-207.
21
*^A11
All this was strikingly
strik
evidenced by the appearance of the
Syllabus of Rrrors in 1864. This famous politico-religious document
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Our summary intarpratatiee of the positions represented by
Lord John Russell and the Dublin Revie* is nearly ended.

The Brit

ish foreign Minister attributed the Italixm Revolution in 1860 to
misrule of the authoritarian governments of the Pope and the King
of the Two Sicilies as veil as to the corrupting and oppressive in
fluence of franco and Austria.

The Review countered with a case

for these Italian Governments, particularly the Papal government;
contending that Italy's worst enemies were those who preached the
new philosophy of progress, and that the policy of Lord John Russell
was not only inconsistent but also allied with those principles and
powers w h i ^ threatened to destroy the basis of all society and
government.

and the Encyclical Quanta Chira which accompanied it, "were profoundly
upsetting to many within the Church and to others outside who were
friendly disposed to her", but the authoritarian Review greeted both
with very real satisfaction. See Hales, Pio Mono, p. 285. Cf. below.
Article IX of the Syllabus, with the Review*s position as given above,
pp. 48-50.
IX
Errors concerning the Rmtan Pontiff's civil
prlncedon.
LXXV.

Children of the Christian and catholic Church
dispute with each other on the compatibility
of the temporal rule with the spiritual.

IXXVI.

Th« abrogation of that civil power, which the
Apostolic See possesses, would conduce la the
highest degree to the Church's liberty and
felicity.

These documents are discussed fully by the Review which
quotes them in their entirety, both in Latin and in translation,
g . "The Encyclical and Syllabus", m (new ser.), IV (April 1885),
441-528.
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Back to back, those two positions portray the black and the
vAite sides of a complex question.
is the light?

But which is the dark and which

That the contributors to the Review were writing in

the presence of something they considered a calamity and wrong is a
fact* that they had a tendency to exaggerate the evils and the magni
tude of passing events is therefore probable.
said of the other side —

Yet, the same may be

especially the non-Catholic liberal side.

The question is unanswered; but the fact remains that the
Dublin Review reveals the presence of a significant number of res
ponsible British Catholic observers who found reason to condemn the
contemporary liberal interpretation of the Italian Question and
British foreign Policy, 1860-1861.

This is not surprising.

Yet, it

is challenging to British historians who, with few exceptions, have
shown little or no respect for the position represented by the Review;
and who have preserved to this day a nineteenth century liberal
answer to the Italian Question of 1860.
We today who have met the children and the grand
children of European Liberalism and the Revolution,
triio have seen Masaini turn into Mussolini, Border
into Bltler, and the idealistic early socialists
into the intransigent communists, are able from a
new vantage ground to consider once more whether
[the Dublin Review1, or the optimistic believers in
an infallible pr^ress, like [Massini], will have,
in the eyes of eternity, the better of the argu
ment.®*

®%ales, Pio Bono, p. 331.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

A P P E N D I X
CONSIDERATION OP THE LYONS LETTERS
BY E. I. Y. HALES

Qa July 0th, 1860 (two days after the Piedmontese ultimatum
had been sent to Rome, and when interest in the 'Roman Question'
was at its highest), Aeton wrote to Simpson, his fellow editor of
the Rambler* *1 send you notes, which may help for a Roman article
for this week, on Lyons' papers. I got them and read them today.
They are a running commentary on some of my articles, confirming,
thank God, all I said. Honsell, Maguire, etc., are greatly dis
turbed by them. I think Lyons honest. Monsell doubts it . . . .'
The papers refeired to by Acton were the despatches sent by
Mr. (later Lord) Lyons from R o m to his superior, the British Minis
ter at Florence (first Campbell Scarlett, then Lord Normanby), dur
ing the years 1883 to 1858 when Lyons was British Attaché at Rome.
% e y can be read at the Record Office (P. 0. 43, vols. 58, 50, 60,
63, 66, and 68), and they provide evidence of some value as to the
character of life and institutions in the Papal States, evidence
which, though often reflecting adversely upon the Roman administra
tion, is very far from lending colour to the lurid picture of liberal
tradition. The reason why they disturbed 'Monsell, Maguire, etc.',
was that these men, with their ardent, Irish, Roman sympathies, look
ed for a warmer appreciation than they found in them of the qualities
of life at Rome. Monsell and Maguire both had much to do with the
translation and dissemination in England and Ireland of the report
of the French Ambassador at Rome, Rayneval, on the same topic, and
Rayneval was a good deal more enthusiastic about the Roman govern
ment than was Lyons.
Acton found the Lyons despatches congenial and convincing
because they reflected his own viewpoint in which misgivings about
the Roman government were blended with a profounder mistrust of the
revolutionaries. Lyons had a warm admiration for Pie None and a
respect for Antonelli, whom he found accessible, courteous, and
reasonable. He clearly had grave doubts about the efficiency of
the financial administration, but he believed that the charge of
corruption was 'soauivhat exaggerated* and he writes that 'far great
er blame than is just is attributed to Cardinal Antonelli' (January
23rd, 1854). He implies, in several of his despatches, that secular67
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isation is nasdsd in the administration, but one is left wondering
how far this attitude was forced upon him by the policy of Claren
don and Palmerston. Certainly, the villain of the piece, in Lyons'
letters, is the pro-*inister of Finance, Oalli, who was a layman,
and who was relieved of his office in November, 18S4, and replaced
by an ecclesiastic. Mgr. Ferrari, apparently with beneficial results.
After the Congress of Paris, in 1856, it became Lyons' duty, under
instruction from Clarendon, to urge upon the Pope 'Reforms in the
Papal State', and particularly secularisation; and he was obliged
to put arguments in this sense to Antonelli. But it is quite evi
dent (e.g. from his despatch of May 28th, 1856) that he found much
substance in the views of Rayneval, and of Colloredo, the Austrian
Ambassador, who considered it out of place to advise the Pope on
his choice of ministers and who conceived that it was a matter of
the first consequence to support the authority of the Papal govern
ment which had been prejudicially affected by the publicity given
to the proceedings of the Congress — and no doubt particularly,
though they were too polite to say so, to Clarendon's unguarded
outburst there.
Rayneval told Lyons that most of the political prisoners
imprisoned as a result of the revolution had, in fact, been am
nestied. He had also had a return made for him from which he had
found that the total number of prisoners in the Papal State was
smaller, proportionally, than in France. Lyons checked up on this
and found, from the police reports (made at that time to the French
Embassy on account of the occupation), that arrests for political
offences in Rome were in fact very rare, that there were only about
seven or eight arrests daily for all crimes, many being for prosti
tution.
The general implication of the Lyons' letters is that im
provements could be made in the Roman administration if it would
draw upon the wisdom of intelligent liberal laymen of the type of
the Marchese Bevilacqua of Bologna, whereas Acton (who was in Rome
in 1857) believed, and was at one with both Veuillot and Montalembert in W1laving, that the heart of the opposition to the Papal
govemawnt was a determination to exclude the Pope wholly from
temporal power, and perhaps ultimately from spiritual power, and
that concessions on his part were as futile as were Austrian con
cessions at Milan or at Venice. The revolutionaries, in the name
of their new ideas, had decided upon 'No Pope' and upon 'No Austria*
and they would make the government of either unworkable.

According to Mr. Hales, these letters have hitherto re
ceived little attention. S. 1. V. Hales, Pio Neno (Appendix: The
Lyons Letters), p. 243.
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Complete sets of the Dublin Review are scarce; and an in
dex is non-existent. The following pas#hlet, its publishers' note,
and the author's table may prove helpful to the interested reader.
Pamphlet:

The Dublin Review, 1836-1886. Complete list of articles
published between May 1836 and April 1836. London:
Burns, Oates & Washbourne, Ltd., n.d.

Publishers' Rote*

(Taken directly from the pamphlet mentioned above)

The following complete list of contents gives the
names of contributors wherever these have been ascer
tained. The names have been supplied for the earlier
articles t r m the editorial memoranda of Father Matthew
Russell, 8.J., published in the Irish Monthly, vols.
XXI and XXII, collated with the lists preserved in the
Oscott Library. Fuller information concerning these
researches by the late Bishop Casartelli will be found
in the article by him included in the centenary number
of April 1836.
Continuous numbering of the issues was not begun
until the opening of the Fourth Series, at the begin
ning of 1882, when the first volume of the new series
was numbered vol. CX and the new issue appeared as Mo.
2%. The total was miscalculated, and it should have
been Mo. 218. To avoid confusion, the former number
ing has been left uneorreoted in the present volume.
No records have been preserved which could assist
in identifying the writers of most of the articles dur
ing the later years, before it became the practice for
articles to be signed. The discrepancies in spelling
and in the titles of writers have been retained as they
appeared in the list prepared by Dr. Casartelli, or as
they were given in the contents pages of subsequent
volumes.
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